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The aim of this study is two-fold. It will try to identify populist policy fields’ patterns 
in contrast to non-populist positions; it will measure the impact that populist parties 
have on other parties’ policy positions and the party system. The analysis’s critical 
questions are the following: Do populist parties have a stable core of policy positions? 
Or does their essential policy direction change over time? On which policy positions 
do they give up? Is there a distinct cluster of populist policy positions that distinguishes 
populist parties from their contenders within the party system? What impact do populist 
parties have on other political parties’ policy positions, and the party system’s 
competition modem (centripetal or centrifugal)? These perspectives may also 
contribute to the broader discussion if the rise of populist parties reflects the emergence 
of a new cleavage in Europe. 
The research design is based on a quantitative cross-country data analysis with party 
manifestos as the core unit of analysis (MARPOR data set). Four hypotheses will guide 
this analysis: The first hypothesis (flexible policy program) refers to the widely 
acknowledged definition of populism as a ‘thin ideology’ due to the few core concepts 
introduced by Mudde (2010). It will test if populism is more flexible in terms of its 
policy goals and or guiding principles than fully-fledged ideologies like liberalism or 
socialism. The second hypothesis (representation gap) picks up on the notion of populist 
policy supply. It takes a closer look if populist parties try to pursue a different kind of 
policies outside of or in contrast to the mainstream. The third hypothesis (contagion 
effects) points to the relation between the electoral success of populist parties and the 
policy adaption of other parties, especially among established parties. It will test the 
impact of the electoral success by populist parties on other political parties, especially 
parties with a conservative, nationalist, or centrist-right ideology. Finally, the fourth 
hypothesis (polarization effects) deals with the impact of populist parties on the party 
system (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). It will analyze if populist parties have polarizing 
effects on the political party system, changing the party competition mode from 
centripetal to centrifugal. 
The sample, extracted from the MARPOR data set, includes manifestos of political 
parties from twenty different European countries. For a comparative approach between 
West- and East-European party systems, this analysis restricts itself to the recent ‘wave 
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1. Research Questions and State of Research 
The successes of populism – maybe with Donald Trump’s turbulent presidency as the peak 
so far – have stimulated various research fields in political science. The growing concern 
about an era of ‘populist democracies’ (Pappas, 2014) has, for instance, renewed the interest 
in the phenomenon of populism by empirical research of comparative politics (Wuster & 
Kailitz 2017) as much as by normative analysis of political theory (Müller 2016). A common 
focus of these recent trends picks up on the challenges of populist parties and their policies 
to liberal democracies. This focus has also been of growing importance in research on 
political parties and party systems (Albertazzi & Müller 2013; Kriesi, 2014; Mudde & 
Kaltwasser 2012). The purpose of this paper to contribute to this stream of research. It does 
so in emphasizing the 'supply-side' of populist parties. Building on a comparative analysis 
of populist parties and a quantitative approach to their policy positions within the right-left 
continuum, the key questions this paper tries to answer are the following: Is there a cluster 
of policy positions that distinguish populist parties from other (established) parties? Do these 
policy positions reflect their anti-establishment attitude (Jagers & Walgrave 2007)? 
Furthermore, do they have an impact on the party competition and the party system in 
general? 
In contrast to the renewed interest in populism in other political science fields, the research 
field of party politics ranked populism always high on the agenda. This focus held even when 
this attention has strikingly contradicted the lack of political power of populist parties 
(Mudde 2013). What is the reason for this ‘insatiable demand’ (Bale 2012)? Following 
Mudde (2016b), this demand has resulted into ‘three waves,’ with each wave following its 
research paradigm. The first wave (1945-1980) is characterized by the quest for continuity 
between pre-war and post-war periods. Studies in this period take on the fascist legacy and 
try to find answers to whether the democratic rupture after World War II has been deep 
enough to leave the dreadful past behind. Whereas this ‘wave’ was mainly dominated by 
(German and French) historical analyses, the second wave (1980-2000) has been heavily 
influenced by the American social sciences and its ‘modernization theory’ (Bell 1964; Lipset 
& Raab, 1970). This approach tries to prove the point that mainly ‘losers’ of the 
modernization belong to the electorate of radical parties and that roughly 10% of the 
electorate voting for radical parties is within a ‘normal’ range of basically every stable 
democracy – the ‘normal pathology thesis’ (Klingemann & Scheuch 1967; Mudde 2010). In 
this perspective, radical or populist parties result from a particular demand of voters, making 
these parties an independent variable that influences the stability and configuration of a party 
system that characterizes, according to Mudde, the third wave (since the 2000s). 
In sum, during the first and the second wave populist parties, as part of the radical left- and 
right-wing spectrum, serve as an indicator for the integration and stability of the (newly) 
established democracies (first wave) and the (European) party systems (second wave). With 
the third wave, however, populist parties have become of interest not only as products but 
also as producers or ‘suppliers’ of new policies (Kitschelt 1995; Mudde 2007; Kriesi et al. 
2006, 2008, 2012). As suppliers, it was common to describe their role as ‘challengers’ of the 
established parties and party systems – within Europe mainly from the right-wing of the 
political spectrum (with exceptions, e.g., Spain), outside Europe also, and maybe 
Copyright Lembcke. (2021). 
 
 13 
predominantly, from the left-wing (Priester, 2007; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2013).1 Mair 
(2011) took this role attribution even one-step further. He claims that a division of labor 
shapes the European polities’ political process, increasingly furthering the hollowing out of 
democratic party government. The populist parties focus on representing ‘the people,’ 
whereas the established parties are consumed by governing the polity. 
There are two things to be said to Mair’s assessment. First, he stressed the nexus between 
the rise of populism and the weakness of representative democracy in a most comprehensive 
way – a nexus, he thought, could lead to a ‘partyless democracy’ (Mair 2000; 2002). Second, 
as illuminating as his analysis is, his idea of labor division between populist parties and 
established parties seems to be relatively static, though, as Kriesi (2014) has already pointed 
out. There is no reason to believe that citizens hang on to this kind of functional split between 
the ‘core’ of parties that govern (Smith, 1989) and the others that represent dissatisfaction. 
Instead, it is more likely to assume a more dynamic process in which populist parties have 
their share in transforming the party systems. And this assumption seems to be even more 
plausible after the long cycles of de-alignment in Western Europe and growing experiences 
of governing parties in Eastern Europe. Against this background, it becomes clear that at 
present, one of the critical questions of the research on party systems is whether populist 
parties are a ‘threat or corrective for democracy’ (Decker 2006; Mény & Surel 2002; Mudde 
& Kaltwasser 2012; Mudde 2016a). Will they provide a chance to stop de-alignment 
processes and connect the party system again closer to the society’s cleavages (Kriesi 2014)? 
Or will they, as Mair feared, foster the process of hollowing out the European model of party 
democracy up to the point of ‘partyless democracy’? 
These questions depend mostly on the party competition and the influence that populist 
parties exert within this competition with other parties. Several studies have shed light on 
these contexts: Some of them aim at specific issues, among them especially at the 
immigration issue (Akkerman 2015; Carvalho 2014); others evaluate the impact on the polity 
dimension (Rooduijn 2013; Williams 2006); and both perspectives have increasingly 
included Eastern Europe into the picture (Minkenberg 2002; Minkenberg 2015; Pirro 2015; 
Pytlas 2016). However, insights into the long-term effects of populist parties on the party 
system itself are somewhat sparse (Mudde 2014). And many of them are still linked to case 
studies (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). Some provide valuable analyses of the party system’s 
specific qualities (e.g., Akkerman & Rooduijn 2015: inclusion/exclusion of populist parties).  
This contribution is two-fold to evaluate the impact populist parties can impose on their 
competitors: It will try to identify populist policy fields’ patterns in contrast to non-populist 
positions. It will measure populist parties’ impact on other parties’ policy positions and the 
party system. The analysis’s critical questions are the following: 
                                                 
1 Usually, these two types are dubbed as ‘exclusionary’ (right-wing) and ‘inclusionary’ (left-wing) populism 
(Mudde & Kaltwasser 2013; Priester 2011). Considering the ‘war of words’ (Mudde 1996) in the field of 
populism, it is quite astonishing that this differentiation has been generally accepted since both types of 
populism are in effect highly exclusionary. This is obvious for right-wing populism, which frames ‘the people’ 
as a national entity. Nevertheless, it also applies to left-wing populism with its class-oriented concept of ‘the 
people’ (Mény & Surel 2000). The left-wing model of ‘the people’ might appear to be more open and 
permeable compared to the right-wing model, but is, however, nevertheless based on the distinction between 
the ‘haves’ and the ‘have nots,’ which is, of course, a matter of an exclusionary distinction (and decision to be 
made). 
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Tab. 1 – Overview of Research Questions 
Research Questions 
Do populist parties have a stable core of policy positions? Or does their essential policy direction 
change over time? On which policy positions do they give up?  
Do populist parties change their policy positions and their anti-establishment attitude once they 
have entered the government? 
Is there a distinct cluster of populist policy positions that distinguishes populist parties from their 
contenders within the party system?  
What impact do populist parties have on other political parties’ policy positions? 
What impact do populist parties have on the party system’s competition modem (centripetal or 
centrifugal)?  
 
These perspectives may also contribute to the broader discussion if the rise of populist parties 
reflects the emergence of a new cleavage in Europe (Bornschier 2010; Bornschier & Kriesi 
2015; Hooghe & Marks 2018; Ignazi 1992; Ignazi 2017; Kriesi et al. 2008; Merkel 2017; 
Norris & Inglehart 2019; Swank & Betz 2003; Zürn & de Wilde 2016). 
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2. Theoretical Perspectives and Hypotheses 
2.1 Thin-centered ideology 
As a starting point for exploring the theoretical dimensions connected with the five research 
questions, this paper uses the widely acknowledged ‘minimal’ definition of populism 
introduced by Mudde (2004; 2007; 2010). This definition restricts itself to the necessary and 
sufficient core of the concepts, guided by Sartori’s (1970) conceptual strategy that a limited 
number of propensities (low intension) can cover a wide range of empirical phenomena (high 
extension). Against this background, populism is defined as ‘a thin-centered ideology. This 
ideology considers society as a divided entity ultimately separated into two homogeneous 
and antagonistic groups, “the pure people” versus “the corrupt elite,” and which argues that 
politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde 
2004: 543). In a broader sense, this definition reflects two main characteristics: the 
democratic but authoritarian approach to politics in general and the pretty vague, hence 
flexible approach to policy programs. Both features are of matter for the operationalization 
and therefore need some elaboration. 
The populist approach to politics is democratic but illiberal (Pappas 2013). In general, 
populists tend to lack a pluralistic understanding of society. They do not like the complexity 
of politics, nor do they appreciate institutions (Canovan 2002). Usually, they see them as an 
expression of an ongoing self-reflexive cycle, vain in attitude and purpose, which in the end 
is of help only for politicians, but seldom for ‘the people.’ In contrast, a populist ideal is a 
form of ‘pure politics of non-politics’ or ‘perfect anti-politics,’ according to Rosanvallon 
(2006: 271–277). The fewer politics, the better it is. Insofar as there is a need for politics, it 
is best done by non-politicians using common sense and acting as a ‘spokesperson of the 
vox populi’ (Abt 2011: 930).2 This gyroscopic role of the spokesman reveals a plebiscitary 
understanding of politics, prone to a flickering attitude toward the policy dimension. 
This ‘flickering’ aspect of policy-making is reinforced by Mudde’s reference to populism as 
a “thin ideology.”3 Since it contains only a few core concepts, populists typically connect 
their views with a ‘host ideology’ to exploit and enrich their policy program to make up for 
this lack of substance. Consequently, the populist ideology is much more flexible already on 
its essential goals and or guiding principles than fully-fledged ideologies. For instance, take 
the difference between the True Finns with a heavy focus on ethnicity and nativism and the 
former Dutch populist party of Pim Fortuyn with his image as a liberal defender of the 
western culture (Reuter 2009). Populists maybe passionate about some of their ideological 
convictions, but ultimately, they are vague, undefined, and undetermined. In this sense, they 
have, as Taggart noted, “an empty heart” (Taggart 2004: 274f.). This ‘empty heart’ of 
populist parties finds its expression in a broad and loose range of policy positions. Except 
for a particular core of policy issues, mostly colored with a distinct anti-establishment flavor, 
populist parties seem to care not too profoundly about a coherent policy program over a more 
extended period. This, at least, is the main upshot of the flexible policy program thesis. It 
                                                 
2 Taggart (2002: 67) also emphasizes the direct linkage between masses and elites. However, he prefers the 
concept of ‘heartland’ instead of ‘people.’ 
3 The distinction between thick and thin-centered ideologies is a conceptional suggestion made by Freeden 
(1998). Whether this is an appropriate conception of populism is a subject of debate; see Stanley (2008) and 
recently the critique by Aslanidis (2016). 
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will test if populism is more flexible in terms of its policy goals and or guiding principles 
than fully-fledged ideologies like liberalism or socialism. 
Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis: Populists parties have a “thin-centered 
ideology” (Mudde 2004). Beyond a fixed core they are more flexible in their 
policies than other parties. 
H1 
2.2 Representing and Governing 
Things may change, however, once the populist parties are in power. Then, electoral 
demands and the ‘cost of government’ influence their decision-making process because now 
the obligation to call the shots and suffer the consequences of disappointing the populist 
base.4 In any case, their anti-establishment approach must be refined or even invented since 
the option of radical opposition towards the political system is diminished (Kitschelt 1995). 
In this context, it is worth remembering Sartori’s critical appraisal of Downs. Down’s insight 
was that the political market is not a one-way-road but an ideological dimension (Sartori 
2005: chp. 10/1): The voters’ demand is not the only thing that matters, the supply-side of 
parties matters, too. As suppliers, political parties can actively respond to demands and 
create them by themselves, for instance, by stretching the political market. This basic 
assumption does not downplay the relevance of cleavages. 
On the contrary, it emphasizes the party elites’ role – in a similar fashion to Lijphart (1968) 
– and their skills in managing the policy supply in the wake of potentially new cleavages 
and creating chances for their ‘product’ on the political market. One of Sartori’s core ideas 
seems that the political market is made of ideology, and ideology allows for adjustable and 
flexible positions (Sartori 2005: chp. 10/4). Do populist use this room for political 
maneuvering once they are in power? As Mair has noted, it is challenging to balance the two 
main functions of political parties: representing and governing (Mair 2009). As governors, 
populist parties are no longer the fringe party on the edge of the right-left scale. Instead, they 
need to manage (rather than meet) demands. Moreover, they must prove themselves as a 
performer in the public’s eyes – a role in which they need to consider not only the demand 
but also the supply side of politics. 
Power Matters Hypothesis: In government, populist parties become more 
“established” by giving up on some policies typical for populists. Once the 
lose power, they return to their “pet” policies.  
H2 
2.3 Dissensus Conflicts 
The recent successes of populist parties are connected to their capacity to re-vitalize cleavage 
structures with new issues. This holds especially for the right-wing populist parties and their 
strategy to ‘culturize’ conflicts that were once conflicts of socio-economic distribution or re-
distribution. In their seminal work on cleavage structures and party systems, Lipset and 
Rokkan (1967: 10) use the functional-ideological axis to show the different modes of conflict 
management and resolution in an ideal typed way. For them, economic conflicts belong to 
the ‘rational’ type that typically produces compromises via bargaining. This, of course, 
changes substantially if, e.g., entitlement issues of social security (scope, amount, etc.) 
become an issue of ‘welfare chauvinism’ and by that an ideologically loaded topic of 
                                                 
4 The Trump presidency is a case in point: e.g., no replace and repeal Obama care. 
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inclusion and exclusion (Norocel 2016). Conflict resolution is no longer determined by 
competition and compromise but by culture or identity. Therefore, the conflict’s 
characteristics change from compromise or consensus to ‘dissensus’ (Aubert 1963). 
Similarly, populist parties – left and right alike – have re-vitalized the center-periphery 
cleavage due to the contrast between the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’ (Kriesi 2014: 
375). Firstly, this kind of framing portrays the conflict in a fashion of intensified morality 
with a clear-cut contradiction between ‘the people’ vs. ‘the elite’ as the age-old story of ‘the 
good vs. the evil.’ Secondly, within this framing, the conflict between ‘the people’ vs. ‘the 
elite’ is reinforced by and fueled with the mechanisms of bottom-up demands and top-down 
decisions. The opposition to the top-down decisions aggregates quite easily into an 
opposition ‘to the system.’ Therefore, populist parties attempt to contrast themselves from 
the policy consensus among ‘established’ political parties (Kitschelt 1995; critical Kailitz 
2006). They typically appeal to the public by emphasizing that they are different from ‘the 
elites’ and their partisan games. Populists claim that these political elites pursue only their 
interests and fail to represent ‘the people.’ Is this claim only populist rhetoric, or is it a policy 
strategy designed to exploit representation gaps? The representation gap hypothesis picks 
up on the notion of populist policy supply. It takes a closer look at whether populist parties 
try to pursue a different kind of policies outside of or in contrast to the mainstream. 
Gap of Representation Hypothesis: Populist parties make use of their anti-
establishment approach to politics by exploiting policy issues that established 
political parties fail to represent. 
H3 
2.4 From Outsiders to Insiders 
As for the rise of right-wing populist parties in Europe, Ignazi (1992; 2017) has argued that 
they result from a “silent counter-revolution.” Just like the Greens, which originated from 
the cleavage between materialism and post-materialism since the 1970s in West Europe, the 
right-wing populist parties have sprung, according to Ignazi, from the same cleavage as a 
countermovement. This approach can be linked to Mudde’s ‘Zeitgeist thesis’ (Mudde 2004). 
It invites a paradigmatic shift in the research on these parties (Mudde 2016b: 16): Regardless 
of their centrifugal strategies (which may potentially endure), they come into the picture as 
relatively integrated members of the party system, and no longer (only) as outsiders or new 
challengers. To what extent do these parties only cultivate forms of ‘pure politics of non-
politics,’ as Rosanvallon (2006) has dubbed the populist approach? Do they have long-term 
policy preferences, or is the core of their policy the de-legitimation of party government, as 
we know it? 
Moreover, do populists seek to provide alternatives to the policy mainstream? Furthermore, 
do they have the power to push the agenda within a party system? Alternatively, are their 
claims of representing ‘the people’ only a rhetorical device without impact on other parties. 
These questions point to the effect that the rise of populism has on the party systems in 
Europe.  
The contagion hypothesis picks up on the relation between the electoral success of populist 
parties and the policy adaption of other parties, especially among established parties. This 
phenomenon has been dubbed ‘Rechtsruck’ (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Arzheimer, 2009), at 
least for political parties with a conservative, nationalist, or centrist-right ideology. 
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Contagion Hypothesis: With success of populist parties at the ballot boxes, 
other parties (of the same political spectrum) feel the pressure to take a stance 
and react to this pressure by taking over populist positions.  
H4 
 
As for the party systems, one of the critical questions is whether this polarization changes 
the dynamics of the party competition from centripetal to centrifugal dynamics. This process 
is, in essence, what Mair (2011) was worried about when he coined the phrase of the 
‘hollowing out’ of party politics. The dysfunctional division of labor can quickly end up in 
a vicious cycle between parties with an almost exclusive focus on the representative function 
and parties with a sole focus on the governing role. The polarization hypothesis deals with 
the impact of populist parties on the party system (Wolinetz & Zaslove 2018). It will analyze 
if populist parties have polarizing effects on the political party system, changing the party 
competition mode from centripetal to centrifugal. 
Polarization Hypothesis: The rise of populism effects the mode of competition 
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3. Data set and Indices  
The following analysis uses the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR) 
data with the recent dataset version 2020a (Volkens et al. 2020). 
3.1 MARPOR 
The sample used for this study includes manifestos of political parties from 15 different 
European countries. For a comparative approach between West- and East-European party 
systems, this analysis restricts itself to the recent ‘wave of populism’ (von Beyme, 1988; 
Andersen & Bjørklund, 1994; Decker, 2004; Luther, 2008; Mudde, 2013) from 1990-2019. 
This study uses two partially overlapping data sets for this period: PSW and PSG (fig. 1, 
tab. 2). 
3.1.1 Established Party Systems in West Europe (PSW) 
Five different data samples of populist parties have been compared for the PSW sample 
construction (Franzmann & Lewandowsky 2020; Mudde, 2013; Taggart 1995; van Kessel 
2015; Wolinets 2018). Because of analytical clarity, this study follows a narrowly defined 
selection of cases. The compilation focuses on stable party systems as a base for a clear-cut 
assignment of the manifestos to classical non-populist party families (NPP) and a straight-
forward identification of right-wing populist parties (PP). Consequently, the present 
selection is mostly identical to the sample of Franzmann & Lewandowsky (2020), which has 
been expanded in some cases (app. 1.1).  
In addition to identified populist parties, the data set also includes those “relevant parties” 
(Sartori 2005) of each the party system of the PSW sample that belong to one of the 
following party families (PF): Greens (GRN), Liberals (LIB), Conservatives (CONS), Social 
Democrats (SocD), Socialists (SOC). The assignment’s basis is the party affiliation at the 
EU level or the parties’ self-description (e.g., in case of Switzerland; see the app. 1.1 for the 
complete list of the PSW sample). The assignment aimed to identify the right-wing populist 
parties, not right-wing extremist parties. Those were excluded from the sample. In sum, the 
data set contains 98 populist manifestos and 509 non-populist manifestos that were assigned 
to other party families. 
3.1.2 European Party Systems with Populists in Government (PSG) 
The intention behind this sample’s creation is to investigate the impact of government 
participation on populist parties. This sample contains only manifestos of populist parties, 
namely those that, first, have already (co-)formed or supported a government. Furthermore, 
second, have written a manifesto based on this experience, which is coded in the Manifesto 
2020a dataset. The latter condition is necessary for the empirical observation of populist 
once they are in power. For this reason, prominent and more recent examples (e.g., Syriza 
in Greece) are not included.  
The basis for the selection was the samples of Franzmann / Lewandowsky (2020), 
https://popu-list.org/ and for the government periods http://www.parlgov.org/. 
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Fig. 1 – Samples PSW and PSG 
 
Source: Creator: CrazyPhunk, ed. by Georgi (GNU-Licence), online: 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Europa.svg. 
3.2 RILE and Other Indices  
This dataset based on party manifestos provides for the so-called RILE index. This index is 
a scale with the purpose of mapping party manifestos in the universe of the right-left 
continuum as a one-dimensional spatial model that can be applied to the different European 
party systems.  
RILE index (Right-Left Score) aggregates party policy positions, categorizes them as either 
‘right’ or ‘left’ policy positions, and measures the cumulated score of political parties on 
various items of these two scales: 
RILEScore = |scoreRight|-|scoreLeft| [0 > scoreRight v scoreLeft < 100 [with a uniformly continuous interval of 
the RILEScore from -100 to +100] 
A positive sum of these two scales indicates an overall policy position on the right side of 
the right-left continuum, a negative sum a left position.5 In a similar fashion the CULT index 
covers the socio-cultural dimension of the RILE, just as the ECO index the socio-economic 
dimension and the POSTM index the positions along the Materialism v. Post-Materialism 
dimension. These indices are defined in the following way:6 
CULTScore = |CULTRight| - |CULTLeft| [0 > CULTRight v CULTLeft < 100  
[uniformly continuous interval of the CULTScore from -100 to + 100]  
ECOScore = |ECORight| - |ECOLeft| [0 > ECORight v ECOLeft < 100  
[uniformly continuous interval of the CULTScore from -100 to + 100] 
POSTMScore = |ECORight| - |ECOLeft| [0 > ECORight v ECOLeft < 100  
[uniformly continuous interval of the CULTScore from -100 to + 100]  
                                                 
5 For the composition of the RILE index, see the appendix. 
6 For the composition of the CULT, ECO, and POSTM indices, see the appendix. 
Tab. 2 – PP and Non-PP manifestos 
 manifestos PSW (■) PSG (■) 
PP 133 98 80 
Non-PP 509 509 - 
∑ 642 607 80 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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4. Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis  
Given the Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis, populist parties have a less steady or stable 
stand on policy positions. In contrast to political parties with an affiliation to ‘thick-centered 
ideologies’ (liberalism, socialism, etc.) ideology, populist parties with a ‘thin-centered 
ideology’ tend to have incoherent policy positions right-left continuum, which are 
sometimes even mutually exclusive. The following approaches try to make sense of this 
hypothesis and use various techniques of analysis. Table 3 provides a quick overview of the 
different approaches, methods, and the sections in which they are the research subject. 
Tab. 3 – Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis: Approaches 
Questions Analysis Focus Method  Sec. 





Mean/median comparison of 
policies: boxplots 
4.1 
Do populists have a stable 
ranking of their priorities? 
Manifestos; 
PF 
Inter-PF Policy ranking ordered by mean 4.1 
Do populists switch easily 
between “hot” topics? 
Manifestos; 
PF 
Inter-PF SD comparison: boxplot 4.1 
Do populists switch easily 






CULTURE, ECO, POSTM; 
Cohen’s d 
4.2 




Median-mean difference: boxplots; 
Cohen’s d 
4.3 





Frequency of items; SD 
comparison 
4.4 





Mean/median comparison of top 3 
policies: boxplots 
4.4 
Note: PF = party family 
4.1 Policy Profiles 
Do populists have a stable policy core at all? Or does vox populi mean frequently turning 
one’s flag to the wind? This study will look at the center of populist policies to answer this 
question. It is a quantitative analysis of party manifestos; and it starts with the following 
idea: Suppose there is a focus on specific policies in these manifestos. In that case, high 
mean values are expected for these (few) policies (due to strong statistical outliers), while 
correspondingly smaller mean values for the remaining policies. If, on the other hand, the 
range of topics is scattered (over periods, between parties, between manifestos, or even 
within each manifesto) or if the focus is less clear or even variable, the expected distribution 
will be broader with correspondingly fewer outliers (fig. 2-3). 
Fig. 2 – Distribution 
of Policy Items: PP v. NPP 
Fig. 3 – Distribution 
of Policy Items: All PF 





Source: MARPOR 2020a MARPOR 2020a 
According to the interquartile range (IQR),7 the mean distribution of the policy items is 
broader for the populists in the middle range than for the other parties. Moreover, both the 
4th quartile and the median are above the average of the other parties. In other words: 
Because the lower 50% and 75% of the policy categories are more strongly represented in 
percentage terms among the Populists (e.g., compared with the Greens), whereas the policies 
in the upper range have less relevance.  
Fig. 4 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: PP v. NPP 
Source: 
MARPOR 2020a. 
According to the initial considerations, priorities are “outliers,” i.e., topics with the highest 
mean values compared to the other policy items. However, these values are smaller for the 
Populists compared to the other party families. Only the Liberals are similarly “restrained,” 
                                                 
7 The IQR measures the width of the interval in which the middle 50% of a sample lies, i.e., the mean values 
of the policy categories. 
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while the Socialists and Greens place a much stronger emphasis on thematic priorities 
(app. 2.1). 
The policy ranking confirmes this finding (fig. 4). Suppose we arrange the MARPOR dataset 
items for each party family according to the mean’s size and compare the respective 
distributions with each other. In that case, slight but discernible differences in prioritization 
between the Populists and the other parties emerge. 
Fig. 5 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: 
PP v. GRN 
Fig. 6 – Policies-Ranking by Mean: 
PP v. LIB 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a. Source: MARPOR 2020a. 
Like the Liberals, the Populists’ top issues are less prominently represented in the 
manifestos. This difference is also illustrated by the two boxplots, which show on the one 
hand the difference between the populists and the Greens – with a noticeably different weight 
in the top issues – and on the other hand the difference to the Liberals, where there is hardly 
any difference in the top issues (fig.  5-6). 
In sum, the populist’s focus on their priorities less strong compared with progressives. They 
contribute less to the populist’s policy profile. What are the reasons? One of them could be 
that the populists change their top issues more frequently than other parties. Consequently, 
the mean values reflect issue cycles. According to the motto: What was a hot topic yesterday 
has already cooled down today. From a structural point of view, this assumption should be 
evident from the percentage distribution of policy items within the party manifestos. More 
precisely, the distribution should display a high variance: many large, few small values. The 
standard deviation for each manifesto may prove the point: A larger standard deviation 
suggests that the percentages in a manifesto differ more for different categories. Do populist 
parties change their top issues more often than other parties? As an indication for this 
possibility, this study looks at the structure of the party families’ manifestos and compares 
the percentage distribution within the manifestos.8  
                                                 
8 To give an example: Let us assume that social democratic and populist manifestos always follow the same 
pattern: the top issue typically gets 50%, the second 30%, and the third the remaining 20%, and each manifesto 
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Fig. 7 – SD of each Manifesto: 
PP v. NPP  




Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
A simple measure of the distribution of percentages within a manifesto is the variance across 
the per101-per706 categories. Since a maximum of 100% can be distributed in total, the 
remaining categories’ percentage value necessarily turns out to below, provided that a few 
categories take a high percentage value. Since the variance is sensitive to “outliers,” it 
follows that the higher the variance within a manifesto, the weightier some top issues are. 
Suppose the party family’s variance is now distributed in a higher range overall than that of 
other party families. In that case, it can be assumed that specific topics tend to be more 
prominent in the individual manifestos than in the comparison families. 
In a comparison of the variances, the populists tend to be on average or slightly above 
(though not significantly; fig. 7). The comparison to Social Democrats is revealing in this 
context (fig. 8): The latter have higher average values in the top issues compared to the 
Populists. However, the manifestos’ variance (with a somewhat narrow distribution) is lower 
on average and significantly so, albeit with a small effect size. This result suggests that 
populists have at least comparable weights of top issues in each manifesto. However, the 
lower mean value then provides evidence for the thesis that populists are more flexible in 
top issues. The comparison with Socialists or Conservatives also suggests this. 
4.2 Policy Hopping 
The approach of policy hopping assumes that populist parties change their policy stance 
more often than other parties. They may be not less ideological in the many fields of ordinary 
policy-making (characterized by high RILE scores) – and even try to politicize them –, but 
they switch from one position to another over time (characterized by scores indicating a 
broad policy range).  
                                                 
corresponds to this distribution. And suppose that social democrats had welfare (positive) at 50%, while 
populists had europe (negative) at only 10% after counting the top issues. This distribution would lead to the 
following conclusion: Given a constantly similar distribution of percentages within the manifestos welfare 
(positive) is the first choice for social democrats, on the agenda in every manifesto, while populists switch. 




The RILE-spread tries to capture this second element with an index robust against policy 
switches within the Right-Left spectrum (positive/negative scores) but reflects the range of 
them. The following matrix (tab. 4) translates this assumption into a model of ideal-typed 
outcomes. Hereafter, right-wing populist parties should be displayed in the first quadrant 
(whereas left-wing populist parties are not the subject of this analysis, would be displayed 
in the fourth quadrant). 
Tab. 4 – Matrix of left- and right-wing populism 
  RILE-Spread 
  Low High 
RILE-Score 
Right II I 
Left III IV 
 
The logic of the spread index – the spread score in-/decreases with the policy range. See the 
following formula: 
RILEspread = RILERIGHT score * RILELEFT score 
The logic of the spread index does not only apply to the RILE, but also to the other indices, 
CULT, ECO, and POSTM.  
4.2.2 Findings 
This analysis uses the PSW sample to test this approach of the Flexible Policy Program 
Hypothesis. As expected, the plot (fig. 9) clearly shows the high RILE scores of PP, 
compared to the NPP bulk. The RILE spread does not provide a clear-cut distinction between 
the populists and the other party families. 
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Fig. 9 – RILE-score & 
RILE-Spread: PP v. NPP 




Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The picture becomes somewhat clearer if we compare the manifestos of the party families. 
The boxplot displays the difference of the RILE spreads between the PP and the other 
political parties (fig. 10), and it shows the differences between the Greens and the Socialists 
on the one side and the populists on the other. In both cases are the mean and median of the 
left party manifestos below the average, whereas the populist manifestos are clearly above.  
Tab. 5 – Difference between PP and NPP: Spread (Cohen’s d)9 
Populists GRN LIB SocD SOC CONS All NPP 
(n=98) (n=85) (n=118) (n=108) (n=72) (n=134) (n=509) 
RILE-Spread 1.14*** 0.12 0.42** 0.93*** 0.24 0.34** 
ECO-Spread 0.55*** 0.25 0.09 0.66*** 0.42** 0.01 
CUL-Spread 0.89*** 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.87*** 0.13 0.71*** 
POSTM-Spread 0.61*** 0.60*** 0.58*** 0.66*** 0.06 0.50*** 
Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01. 
This distinction is confirmed by the relatively large effect size, measured by d (see tab. 5): 
The group difference Populists v. Greens is relatively high (d = 1.14), like the difference 
with the Socialists (d = .93), and, to a lesser extent, with the social democrat difference (d = 
.42). The other indices reproduce the same group distinctions in terms of the different 
spreads, but to a lesser degree (indicated by d with lower scores in each column; see tab. 5). 
The boxplot for the POSTM index is another case in point (fig. 12). However, it is worth 
                                                 
9 The guideline to interpret the effects of d (Cohen’s d) is: 0.2 = small, 0.5 = moderate, and 0.8 = strong (Cohen 
1988). 
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noting the effect of the POSTM index. The plot (fig. 11) shows a clear cleavage and the 
dimension Materialism v. Post-Materialism, dividing the Greens and the Populists into two 
separate ideological camps.  
Fig. 11 – POSTM-Score and 
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. GRN 
Fig. 12 – POSTM-spread: All PF 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
As for the parties center-right of the European party systems, the differences are much 
smaller not only in the RILE scores but also in the RILE spread (fig. 10). However, they are 
still discernible, and in areas where one would expect these differences (tab. 5). Compared 
with the Conservatives, the differences with the populists are mainly in economics (d = .42). 
In the case of the Liberals in the cultural area (CULT d = .70; POSTM d = .60) - in each case 
with moderate effect sizes. 
4.3 Policy Ignorance 
Instead of changing topics and positions, populist’s policy flexibility can also its expression 
in being mostly indifferent to several policies. How can we quantify such an attitude? 
Suppose the following procedure: We determine the percentage for each policy item in 
which it appears in all manifestos of a party family, regardless of its “weight.” The core topic 
of a manifesto is included in the calculation in the same way as a one-time marginal note.  
The overview of the topics that can be found most frequently in the manifestos of the 
populists in terms of number. As mentioned (see 4.1), the following ranking again shows 
that the populists use their top themes less frequently than the other parties – except for the 
Liberals (app. 2.3). If we now turn from the frequency per item to the overall distribution – 
and here above all to the ratio of median and mean –, we see at first glance a uniform 
distribution. The mean value is almost identical between populists and the other parties. Only 
the median of the populists is slightly higher (fig. 14).  
Fig. 13 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. NPP  




Source: MARPOR 2010a. 
However, the comparison between party families (fig. 15), especially between Populists and 
Greens, is instructive (given that the median is a very robust measure, whereas the mean is 
sensitive to distributional margins).  
Fig. 14 – Share of Policies 
in all Manifestos: PP v. NPP 
Fig. 15 – Share of Policies 
in all Manifestos: All PF 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
For the populists, the median is to the mean’s right, which suggests a left-skewed 
distribution. In other words, the low number of cases that the policy items have on the 
broader half to the left of the median decreases the mean. In contrast, some issues repeatedly 
appear in the manifestos increase the mean, while the bottom 50% of policies are much 
closer together in the Green manifestos. What conclusion can we draw from these results? 
We cannot confirm the assumption that populists ignore policy issues. Not all issues are 
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always on the agenda, but this finding does not justify any conclusions beyond that. Does 
the result change if we look at the individual parties below the party families? The contrast 
between populists and non-populists looks familar (fig. 16). There is not much say about the 
result of this comparison. 
Broken down by party family affiliation, however, there are some discernable effects. The 
populists are above the average of their competitors in both median and mean values. One 
might interpret these findings as a sign of superficiality on the populist’s side, especially in 
cases where policies appear that are not expected to be an integral part of the populist profile 
(e.g., environmentalism positive; see fig. 17). Nevertheless, it would be far-fetched to speak 
of it as a form of sustained policy ignorance.10 
Fig. 16 – Share of Policies 
per Party: PP v. NPP 
Fig. 17 – Share of Policies 
per Party: All PF 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
4.4 Internal Diversity 
The question of the internal diversity of the populist party family still needs to be answered. 
What is the operative idea? We identify each party’s mean value in each policy category and 
then determine the standard deviation in each policy category between the parties’ family 
parties. This is a simple procedure to measure the parties’s difference within a party family 
regarding a particular policy. The distribution of these standard deviations is shown in the 
boxplots (fig. 18-19). The assumption underlying this procedure is that if the populist parties 
differ significantly among themselves – especially if they fluctuate on the core issues – there 
should also be high standard deviations in many policy categories, at least, higher than for 
the other party families. Thus, the distribution should tend to be above that of other party 
families. The boxplots show, the result for the Populists tends to be ahead of the left-wing 
parties only. The median of the distribution is below that of the Liberals, the mean of the 
distribution below that of the Liberals and Conservatives. The upper quadrant is just ahead, 
                                                 
10 Cohen’s d indicates medium effects for the mean differences in the Greens case, which tends to confirm the 
previous findings, since more categories < 2 are found for the Greens, or a lower standard deviation of the 
lower 80% (app. 2.4). 
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but all in all, these findings do not justify the assumption that the Populist’s family is 
inernally more divers.11 Yet, t may be possible to sharpen the analysis a little more. 
Fig. 18 – Internal Diversity 
of Party Families: PP v. NPP 
Fig. 19 – Internal Diversity 
of Party Families: All PF 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
A look at the weighting of the top three issues of each party (fig. 20) indicates internal 
heterogeneity. The Populists are behind the Greens; and for the Socialists, though the 
differences are marginal. Compared with the other party families, however, the boxplot 
for the Populists (with higher mean and median) indicates higher percentages of the top 
3 issues. Why should this be read as an indication of internal diversity? As already shown 
(see 4.1, fig. 4), the average top three of the populist party family tends to be weaker than 
the other party families. The top-3 of the individual parties, in turn, tend to be above the 
top-3 of the parties in other families, except for the Greens.  
In other words, populist parties do give weight to their top issues, but these issues change 
between parties (or within a party). What is a ‘hot issue’ for a populist party often does 
not have it for the party family (hence the comparatively low mean value). Moreover, to 
this extent, we can also speak of a somewhat higher internal diversity within the populist 
party family. 
 
Fig. 20 – Top-3 Policies: All PF 
                                                 
11 However, the standard deviation in the data set varies with the weighting of the categories due to the 
percentages. For the distribution of the coefficients of variation and (since these are again sensitive in the range 
of values close to 0) and the coefficients of variation of all policy categories that average at least 1 percent, see 
the corresponding presentation in the appendix.  




Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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5. Power Matters Hypothesis 
What influence does the takeover of the government have on populist parties? Do populists 
use their newfound power to implement their programs? Or does the program change under 
the table due to the multiple circumstances that new governments typically must consider? 
The Power Matters Hypothesis formulates the expectation that populist governing parties 
will have to make several concessions in their policies with the effect that they become 
“more established.” These restrictions will, in turn, be abandoned as soon as these parties no 
longer must bear the “costs of government.” 
5.1 Operationalization 
The following analyses are based primarily on the PSG sample. This sample includes all 
manifestos of populist parties that, first, participated in or actively supported a government 
in the period 1990-2019 and, second, participated in an election with a manifesto from this 
position of government participation (or immediately afterward, if the respective 
government was dissolved before the end of the respective legislative period). Only based 
on the second condition can the possible effects emanating from government participation 
be examined.12  
In terms of Populist’s participation in government, we have divided manifestos into three 
phases for the 1990–2019-time frame: 
 In government: manifestos during the government period, including those manifestos 
that precede the deselection or take place in the transition to new government 
participation or support from the PP. 
 Pre-government (in opposition): manifestos published before the PP was even 
involved in government. 
 Post-government (in opposition): manifestos in opposition and after first-time 
participation in government. 
Fig. 21 – In Government and Opposition  
 
Based on these three groups, we have identified the mean values for the items per101-per706 
of the MARPOR data set, for the indices (see 3.2), and for mini-spreads following the logic 
of the RILE spreads. With the help Cohen’s d, we calculate the effect sizes using the group 
of populists in government serves as the reference group. For an East-West comparison, the 
mean values are also compared with the PSW sample, i.e., more precisely with those 
populists who are not included in the sample, because they were not involved in government 
in any way in the reference period. 
                                                 
12 As a result, some prominent cases of populist governments or government participation are not included in 
the sample. These include M5S in Italy and Syriza in Greece. 
















Are there differences between the populists who are in government and those who pursue 
politics in opposition? And what are they? Answers to these questions will be provided by 
analyses of the two samples PSG and PSW. In the first case, the “government-experienced” 
populists are compared based on the phase classification (pre-government, in government, 
and post-government). This is followed by a comparison between the “government-
experienced” populists and those without any government involvement. 
5.2.1 Populists in Government und Opposition (PSG) 
The following table contains the twelve items in which populists in government and populists 
in opposition differ most clearly from each other. The items are ordered according to the 
effect size (tab. 6). 
Tab. 6 – In government (n = 26) and opposition: Top-12 (effect size) 
Variable Label 
in opposition pre-government post-government 
(n=54) (n=34) (n=20) 
per603 traditional morality + 0.59* 0.55* 0.71* 
per402 incentives 0.56* 0.83** 0.15 
per414 economic orthodoxy 0.55 0.43 0.57* 
per305 political authority 0.53 0.41 0.61* 
per704 
middle class and 
professional groups 
0.47 0.81* 0.05 





0.42* 0.50* 0.54 
per304 political corruption 0.38* 0.48* 0.31 
per401 free market economy 0.38 0.68** 0.37 
per105 military - 0.38* 0.56* 0.09 
Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01. 
The range of effect sizes for the two-group comparison in government and opposition is 
relatively small (.38-.59); the sizes are all in a low-moderate range. The effect becomes 
noticeably stronger in three cases, provided that the subgroups in the three-group comparison 
pre-government and post-government are considered. The following items then stand out: 
(economic) incentives (.83), middle class and professional groups (.81), and traditional 
morality (.71). We should examine these items in more detail: 
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Fig. 22 – Incentives (economic): 
In Government v. In Opposition  
Fig. 23 – Incentives (economic): 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
In the first case of (economic) incentives, the differences are already striking in the two-
group comparison (fig. 22). In the three-group comparison, it shows that the contrast is 
mainly caused by the opposition group “pre-government” (fig. 23). This finding suggests 
that populists learn to use the instruments of supply-side oriented economic incentive control 
(tax breaks, etc.) for their purposes (and their clientele). They develop a different view of 
this policy area in the “post-government” phase; and it seems that the government experience 
contributes to this change. 
Fig. 24 – Middle Class/Professional Groups:  
In Government v. In Opposition  
Fig. 25 – Middle Class/Professional Groups: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
In the second case, the two-group analysis for the item middle class and professional groups 
is not particularly meaningful due to the numerous outliers (fig. 24), but the three-group 
comparison is more so. This comparison suggests that the affinity of populists to the 
functional elites increases with the period of government and especially in the aftermath of 
this period (fig. 25). Somewhat exaggeratedly, one could say that populists become more 
“bourgeois” because of their experience in government. 
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Fig. 26 – Traditional Morality +: 
In Government v. In Opposition  
Fig. 27 – Traditional Morality +: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
In the third case, the period of government is different from the two opposition phases. The 
differences are already striking in the two-group comparison (fig. 26): Whereas populists are 
reluctant to refer to traditions, religion, family life, etc. during their time in government, it 
appears to be a suitable tool for them in opposition.  
This assumption is not only based on the apparent differences in the median and mean 
values; it is also supported by the three-group comparison (fig. 27). Traditional morality 
positive seems to be a good/useful opposition theme to which the populists return even in 
their post-government era. – In two other policy areas we can see the same back and forth: 
political authority and political corruption. 
Fig. 28 – Political Authority: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. 29 – Political Authority: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
It is evident that affiliation with the government or the opposition plays a role in both themes. 
One issue – political authority (fig. 28-29) – is pro-government, possibly also because it 
helps to play off official bonuses. The other – political corruption (fig. 30-31) – tends to be 
anti-government and is a typical rallying cry of the opposition. Therefore, it is not surprising 
that the contrast between government and opposition can be seen in both the two-group and 
three-group comparisons.  
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Fig. 30 – Political Corruption: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. 31 – Political Corruption: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The situation is similar for two other topics: While democracy is a typical opposition issue, 
economic orthodoxy is typically close to the government. This is already reflected in the 
respective two-group comparisons (fig. 32, 34). In the case of democracy, the three-group 
range also shows that the emphasis on democracy decreases in the post-government period 
compared to the pre-government phase (fig. 33). In both stages, however, the issue acquires 
greater importance than during the government phase. 
Fig. 32 – Democracy: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. 33 – Democracy: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. 34 – Economic Orthodoxy: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. 35 – Economic Orthodoxy: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Monetary and budgetary requirements are at the core of economic orthodoxy (fig. 35). 
Moreover, they are part of the standard repertoire of every government to keep political 
desires in check. And populists seem to be no exception. Accordingly, the recourse in post-
government also sinks to the level of the pre-government opposition perios. 
Fig. 36 – Free Market Economy: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. 37 – Free Market Economy: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Incidentally, the free market economy theme underscores that economic orthodoxy is less 
ideological than government power’s practical option. Suppose the two-group comparison 
already shows a clear difference (fig. 36). In that case, the three-group comparison suggests 
that government time triggers a learning process - apparently with a dampening effect for 
belief in the free market economy (fig. 37). 
5.2.2 Populists with and without Government Experience (PSG/PSW) 
Government experience plays a role. Several items reveal differences that, taken together, 
indicate that populists become more “established” during their time in government and 
afterward.  




cult_r CULT-Scoreright 0.82*** 
per410 Economic growth+ 0.71*** 
cult CULT index 0.69*** 
pm_r POSTM-Score+right 0.69*** 
per603 Traditional morality + 0.62** 
pm POSTM 0.60** 
per109 Internationalism - 0.58** 
rile_r RILE-Score 0.55** 
per108 Europe + 0.54*** 
trad_morality_spread Traditional morality+ * Traditional morality- 0.51* 
internationalism_spread Internationalism+ * Internationalism - 0.50** 
per110 Europe - 0.49* 
Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01. 
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Do such differences again emerge in comparing the two groups of populists with government 
experience and populists without government experience? As in the previous section, a group 
comparison based on effect size (Cohen’s d) will serve as a search movement (tab. 7). The 
twelve items that can be used to distinguish the two groups are ordered according to the 
effect’s strength. 
Looking through the list, the cluster of socio-cultural topics is conspicuous. At the same 
time, socio-economic issues are mostly absent, except for economic growth+, which is 
influenced by fundamental questions about the societies’ future viability (e.g., reconciling 
economy and ecology). In the present context, the effect size reflects Western and Eastern 
Europe’s different economic strengths. In this sense, the boxplot below (fig. 38) reveals the 
greater reluctance on populists in the West than to the higher approval on the part of populists 
in the PSG sample, which Eastern European populists dominate. 
Fig. 38 – Government Experience: 
Economic Growth + 
Fig. 39 – Government Experience: 
ECO-Index 
  
Sourxe: MARPOR 2020a Sourxe: MARPOR 2020a 
That this is less about an ideological position in economic policy is also suggested by the 
ECO Index, where Western European populists by and large hold a fundamentally more pro-
business stand (fig. 39). As it turns out, economic growth+ represents a thematic “outlier” 
not only as an economic issue but also ideologically. A small selection in this regard: 
Fig. 40 – Government Experience: 
CUL-Score + (right) 
Fig. 41 – Government Experience: CUL 
  
Sources: MARPOR 2020a Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. 42 – Government Experience: 
RILE-Score (right) 
Fig. 43 – Government Experience: RILE 
  
Sources: MARPOR 2020a Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
Based on the two indices, RILE and CULT, a clear pattern emerges: The populists without 
government experience are ideologically positioned further to the right of the political 
spectrum; this applies not only to the RILE as a whole and the selection of “right-wing” 
items; it also applies to topics of the socio-cultural axis (e.g., national way of life positive, 
law and order positive, or multiculturalism negative) or to the dimension materialism v. 
post-materialism (app. 3.2). 
Fig. 44 – Government Experience: 
Europe - 
Fig. 45 – Government Experience: 
Traditional Morality+ 
  
Sources: MARPOR 2020a Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
Even on traditional morality, which in many respects still has a more tangible reality in 
Eastern Europe than in Western Europe, populists with government experience are more 
reserved (fig. 45). Finally, this also applies to europe itself, with negative (fig. 44) and 
positive (app. 3.2) connotations. Perhaps this ideological restraint is an expression of the 
greater pragmatism that usually accompanies government activities. Particularly given the 
strength of eurosceptic attitudes in both Western and Eastern Europe, this pragmatism on the 
part of populists in the government headquarters of Eastern Europe has repeatedly made it 
possible to cooperate with the EU to secure funding for numerous infrastructure measures.  
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6. Gap of Representation Hypothesis  
Suppose the ideological orientation of populists and their policy positions are somewhat 
more flexible, as the section on the flexible policy program hypothesis has shown in part 
(4.). In that case, populist parties may spot gaps of representation and strategically occupy 
them. Do populists make use of their anti-establishment attitude by exploiting policy issues 
that established parties fail to represent? How to identify these strategies? And what are these 
potential gaps of representation? We understand the representation gaps as a lack of 
contestation between political parties across the policy fields. Moreover, we use the standard 
deviation (SD) of ideological positions as an indicator for party competition within a 
particular policy field: low values indicate a consensus between the parties, whereas high 
values signal that the parties differ substantially from each other. Based on these ideas, the 
following sections try to identify gaps of representation and assess the distance between the 
populist parties and the other political parties that opens the space and the opportunity for 
populists to contest strategically established policy positions or consensus forms. 
6.1 Operationalization 
In this section, the research program’s operationalization contains several steps: Do populist 
parties represent new issues at all? And in what ways do they fill a supposed policy gap? 
What gaps in policy representation do we find? And finally, in which fields is there a 
consensus among the other parties that could be attacked and politicized by the populists? 
(1) Neue Policies: The analysis uses an index developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979) 
for the “effective number of parties” (ENP) to answer the question of whether populist 
parties represent new issues at all and thus (substantially) fill a policy gap. However, the 
focus here is not on parties but on policies in a parliament at a given time. The formula of 
the Laakso-Taagepera index is the following:  











Where n is the number of policy categories (per variables in the data set) > 0 and peri is the average of the 
i-th per variable at election time in the party system.  
The last term plays a role in two ways: First, it is calculated as a pure average, in which each 
party contributes equally weighted to the total mean - and thus enables an answer to the 
question of whether the populists enrich the policy supply. Second, it is the average weighted 
by the parties’ electoral success, combined with the question of whether de facto new 
policies also enter parliament (if the electoral outcome reflects demand). The difference 
between the ENPol values – with and without populists – will explain whether the populists 
effectively represent new policies. 
(2) Gap of representation: The analysis uses two instruments to identify representation gaps. 
The gap is defined as the maximum distance between the mean value of the populists and 
that of the nearest party family. The effect size of the mean difference between populists and 
the respective party families helps to assess the relevance of the gap. In this way, we also 
consider policy items, where the distance between the populists and some of the party 
families is relatively small.  
In addition, it is necessary to consider the respective circumstances of the time. For example, 
suppose a party with a percentage value of 5% for the item europe (negative) was possibly 
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on the fringe of the party spectrum in 1990. In that case, this party could perhaps embody 
the policy mainstream with this value in 2019. As the overall importance of an item 
increases, its variance in the data set tends to increase.13 If both observations concern the 
same item, as indicated in the example, they are initially aggregated without considering the 
location- and time-specific variances that occur within a party family. In case of doubt, 
however, relevant information might be lost.  
For this reason, we have developed an additional heuristic tool for calculating the 
representation gaps: Normalized distances are used instead of percentages per policy. More 
precisely, the calculation is based on a manifesto’s distances to the average in the respective 
party system at the election time, divided by the standard deviation. Finally, we weigh the 
quotient according to the electoral success of the parties. Since this calculation focuses on 
the distance from the center of gravity of the party system, it is an anomaly index. It is 
composed as follows: 
Ano(p. y. c) gives the value of a party x at election time y in party system c from the percentage of the 
associated policy category Per(p. y. c). It holds: 
𝐴𝑛𝑜(𝑝, 𝑦, 𝑐) =  




𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑦, 𝑐)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ = ∑ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑐) ∙
𝑛
𝑖=1
 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑐) 
and 
𝑠𝑑(𝑦, 𝑐) = √
∑ 𝑛 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑐)  ∙ (𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑐) − 𝑃𝑒𝑟(𝑦, 𝑐)̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )²
𝑛
𝑖=1
(∑ 𝑛 ∙ 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒(𝑝𝑖 , 𝑦, 𝑐)
𝑛
𝑖=1 ) − 1
 
Here, n denotes the number of parties in the respective country’s dataset at the election time. 
(4) Policy consensus: In the search for policy areas in which there is a high degree of 
agreement among the non-populist parties, we restrict ourselves to issues of significant 
duration and, at the same time, high weighting, i.e., top issues that consistently appear in the 
top-3. With this in mind, we identify top-3 per election year for all party families and average 
each case across years (weight) and determine the percentage of years in which each issue 
appears in the top-3 (duration). Items above average in weight and time are defined as 
consensus. 
(3) Up and down of policies: Finally, some considerations are needed to capture the policies’ 
trends. For this purpose, the analysis divides the given period of 1990-2020 into three 
sections of roughly equal size according to the number of manifestos: 
Tab. 8 – Number of Manifestos per Period 
  1990-2000 2001-2010 2010-2019 
all 225 215 213 
Sweden 22 22 16 
                                                 
13 Note: Because of the lower limit of 0%, the fluctuations for an item with an average value of 2% cannot be 
as strong for an item with an average value of 20%. 
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Denmark 27 25 17 
Finland 26 16 25 
Netherlands 21 39 24 
France 13 12 20 
Italy 35 35 24 
Germany 15 15 13 
Austria 18 16 12 
Switzerland 35 21 32 
United Kingdom 13 14 30 
Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
For each period, the ranking of policies by mean and trend are determined for populists and 
non-populists alike. 
6.2 Findings 
6.2.1 New Policies 
The first question, whether the populists represent new policies, can be answered relatively 
quickly by looking at the following table: The contribution certainly differs from country to 
country. In some countries, however, the share of policy representation is not insignificant. 
These countries include Switzerland, France, and Germany.14 However, the group 
comparison in the aggregate of the mean values only yields a significant value in the 
unweighted data. 15 
Tab. 9 – Effective Number of Policies: PP v. NPP 
 unweighted weighted 
Country All All NPP PP-Difference All All NPP PP-Difference 
Sweden 15.2 14.4 0.9 14.8 14.2 0.5 
Denmark 19.6 18.5 1.0 16.4 15.7 0.7 
Finland 16.8 15.8 1.0 16.4 15.7 0.7 
Netherlands 23.2 22.3 1.0 24.4 24.1 0.3 
France 23.4 21.0 2.4 22.4 20.5 1.9 
Italy 19.2 18.1 1.2 18.8 18.0 0.8 
Germany 25.0 23.4 1.7 25.9 24.6 1.3 
Austria 20.6 18.7 1.9 20.7 19.0 1.7 
Switzerland 23.1 20.7 2.5 22.6 19.2 3.4 
United Kingdom 21.0 20.1 1.0 18.8 18.6 0.2 
Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
                                                 
14 The weighting component is not able to change the picture in the long term. 
15 Aspects of the party system may also play a role here. 
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6.2.2 Policy Priorities 
In searching for the policies that cause the greatest ideological gap between the populists 
and the other party families, a list of the top-10 has first been drawn up. The following 
boxplots illustrate two of these top issues. 16  
One can see the gaps between the populists and the other party families (fig. 46-47). While 
in the case of the national way of life (positive), the Conservatives also represent this issue, 
albeit to a much lesser extent than the populists, there is no competition in the case of europe 
negative (fig. 48-49).  
Fig. 46 – Ideological gaps: 
National way of life+ 
Fig. 47 – Ideological gaps: 
Europe - 
  
Fig. 48 – Ideological gaps: 
National way of life+ 
Fig. 49 – Ideological gaps: 
Europe - 
  
Sources: MARPOR 2020a Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
The table below provide a complete overview of the differences in policy representation 
(tab. 10). It contains the top 10 identified by the distance measurement (black) and the other 
topics included because of the group comparison because size (red). 
Tab. 10 – Gap of Representation: PP v. NPP (top-10, effect size) 
Populists GRN LIB SocD Soc Cons All NPP 
(n=98) (n=85) (n=118) (n=108) (n=72) (n=134) (n=509) 
national way of life + 1.13*** 0.94*** 1.10*** 1.11*** 0.73*** 1.42*** 
internationalism - 0.94*** 0.84*** 1.04*** 0.56*** 1.06*** 1.18*** 
                                                 
16 For the remaining subjects, see the boxplots in appendix (app. 4.2). 
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europe - 0.63*** 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.44** 0.76*** 1.12*** 
multiculturalism - 0.87*** 0.55*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.72*** 1.03*** 
law and order + 1.68*** 0.82*** 1.02*** 1.44*** 0.44** 1.00*** 
military + 1.26*** 0.54*** 0.84*** 1.23*** 0.38** 0.82*** 
equality + 1.29*** 0.52*** 1.21*** 1.66*** 0.42** 0.78*** 
europe + 0.67*** 0.92*** 1.11*** 0.40* 0.97*** 0.70*** 
traditional morality + 0.67*** 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.66*** 0.09 0.67** 
protectionism + 0.38** 0.45** 0.39** 0.37** 0.35* 0.63** 
internationalism + 0.90*** 0.62*** 0.78*** 0.63*** 0.52*** 0.61*** 
labour groups + 0.63*** 0.39** 1.04*** 1.48*** 0.32* 0.61*** 
peace 0.91*** 0.52*** 0.71*** 1.24*** 0.54*** 0.58*** 
welfare - 0.84*** 0.04 0.76*** 0.89*** 0.34* 0.57*** 
education - 0.58*** 0.17 0.64*** 0.59*** 0.36* 0.52** 
gov-admin efficiency 0.76*** 0.21 0.21 0.71*** 0.28* 0.41* 
Source: MARPOR 2020a | Note: black = max. distance; red: effect size. 
The relevance of cultural themes (national way of life positive, traditional morality positive, 
multiculturalism, equality), which play a central role in the group distinction between the 
populists and the other party families, is already known from different analytical contexts. 
However, this issue area is not the strongest in terms of numbers. Also, if Europe is included, 
a good third of the topics relate to international politics (internationalism positive/negative, 
europe positive/negative, military+, protectionism, peace). Besides, the negative reference 
to internationalism achieves one of the largest effect sizes in the mean comparison of the 
various policies. A third category consists of topics related to the welfare state in the 
narrower or broader sense (welfare, labor groups, education).  
These three categories are suitable for accentuating the differences between the individual 
party families. Thus, international politics is also the area in which the difference between 
the populists and the Conservatives becomes tangible. The latter tend to be much more pro-
European and global than the former. The cultural issue area is the critical point in which 
the Liberals can easily distinguish themselves from the Populists.  
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Fig. 50 – Gap of Representation: 
Welfare (negative) 




Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
In comparing the populists with the parties on the left spectrum, the effect sizes are almost 
universally large, including the welfare state’s issue. Here, the contrast to the bourgeois 
parties becomes apparent. An illustrative example of this is the item welfare negative 
(tab. 10): The group comparison on the part of the populists with the Greens (.84), the 
Socialists (.89), and the Social Democrats (.76) produces high effect sizes in each case, while 
the comparison with the Liberals results in no effect (.04) and with the Conservatives only a 
moderate one (.34). The boxplot in the two-group comparison underscores this issue’s 
general relevance for the group distinction (fig. 50); however, the party families’ overview 
reveals once again the ideological camps (fig. 51), which can be assigned to the left and right 
here. 17 
Tab. 11 – Anomaly Index: PP v. NPP (top-10, effect size) 
Populists GRN LIB SocD Soc Cons All NPP 
(n=24-97) (n=26-84) (n=34-118) (n=31-104) (n=22-69) (n=36-130) (n=157-497) 
internationalism - 1.19*** 1.13*** 1.05*** 0.53*** 1.29*** 1.35*** 
national way of life + 1.54*** 1.15*** 1.36*** 1.50*** 0.56*** 1.27*** 
education - 0.98*** 0.53* 1.17*** 0.98*** 0.87*** 1.17*** 
multiculturalism - 1.42*** 1.20*** 1.31*** 1.28*** 0.47*** 1.12*** 
europe - 0.87*** 1.41*** 1.56*** 0.32 1.06*** 1.12*** 
law and order + 1.96*** 0.95*** 1.15*** 1.63*** 0.37* 1.06*** 
labour groups - 0.82*** 0.29 0.92*** 0.85*** 0.64*** 0.94*** 
military + 1.58*** 0.74*** 0.99*** 1.54*** 0.40*** 0.90*** 
traditional morality + 1.14*** 1.00*** 0.97*** 1.10*** 0.12 0.85*** 
equality + 1.41*** 0.51*** 1.75*** 1.63*** 0.38*** 0.81*** 
europe + 0.75*** 1.36*** 1.30*** 0.20 1.07*** 0.79*** 
labour groups + 0.75*** 0.44*** 1.85*** 1.67*** 0.43*** 0.74*** 
anti-growth economy+* 1.99*** 0.51*** 0.56*** 0.95*** 0.50*** 0.64*** 
                                                 
17 On the economic dimension of populism and its cartography in Europe: Manow 2018; see also Rodrik 2018 
and Oesch 2008, 2015. 
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peace 0.87*** 0.56*** 0.61*** 1.36*** 0.44*** 0.60*** 
welfare - 1.44*** 0.08 1.22*** 1.34*** 0.20 0.59*** 
internationalism + 0.96*** 0.73*** 0.93*** 0.43* 0.43*** 0.59*** 
national way of life -* 1.12*** 0.64*** 0.77*** 1.20*** 0.57*** 0.58*** 
multiculturalism+* 0.77*** 0.79*** 0.66*** 0.66*** 0.58*** 0.56*** 
military - 1.68*** 0.29* 0.72*** 1.57*** 0.12 0.56*** 
environmentalism+* 2.17*** 0.48*** 0.42*** 0.51*** 0.13 0.54*** 
traditional morality -* 0.99*** 0.66*** 0.63*** 0.92*** 0.06 0.52*** 
Source: MARPOR 2020a. | Note: black = max. distance; red: effect size. | *new items. 
This classification is confirmed by the standardization underlying the calculation of the 
anomaly index (tab. 11). With this index, it is also possible to identify some additional policy 
items relevant for analyzing the representation gaps. These new items strengthen the cultural 
dimension’s contrast (national way of life, traditional morality, multiculturalism positive) 
between populist and non-populist parties. And the same is true for the closely related 
dimension of materialism v. post-materialism (anti-growth economy positive and 
environmentalism positive). Accordingly, the group comparison effects between the 
populists and the left-wing parties, especially with the Greens, are also most significant.  
Fig. 52 – Anomaly Index: 
Environmentalism (positive) 




Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The boxplot reveals the conflict (and potential cleavage) on these dimensions between the 
Greens and the Populists’ families (fig. 53). A representative example is the item 
environmentalism+, whose distribution is a mirror image of the item’s national way of life 
(positive). The significant value of the effect size of the group comparison between Populists 
and Greens is exceptionally high (2.17). The results of the anomaly index suggest that 
populists do not limit themselves to representing individual policies. Their concerns go 
beyond that and are directed at the zeitgeist: Populists are broadly concerned with offering 
an alternative to postmaterialism, for which the Greens are the main representee. Ignazi 
(1992, 2017) has found the term “silent counter-revolution” for this orientation. This term is 
apt insofar as it does justice to the comprehensive claim to the representation made by the 
populists. This family of parties, as evidenced by their policy orientation, sees itself not only 
Copyright Lembcke. (2021). 
 
 47 
as a counter-movement against the establishment but, in many cases, also as an alternative 
to the left-liberal-green mainstream. 
6.2.3 Policy Consensus 
For some years now, however, this populist counter-movement has no longer been ‘silent.’ 
Rather, the gaps in representation that, from the populists’ point of view, arise due to a 
neglect of tradition are being marked and politicized. As a rule, this happens through a 
‘blame game’ in which not only the progressive parties are fought, but also the parties to the 
right of center, which from the populists’ point of view has in many cases become part of a 
policy consensus together with the left-wing forces. It is against these forms of party-
political consensus that the populists are directed.  
The following table (tab. 12) lists those topics that, due to their scope (weight) and frequency 
(duration), have acquired particular importance in the manifestos and contribute quite 
significantly to the profile of the respective party family. 
Tab. 12 – Policy Consensus: Top-3  
Items Populists GRN LIB SocD Soc Cons NPP SUM 
welfare + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7 
environmentalism + 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 6 
equality + 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 5 
education + 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 4 
gov.-admin. efficiency 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 3 
labour groups + 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 
law and order + 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
political authority 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2 
tech. & infra. 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 
traditional morality + 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 
anti-growth economy + 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
democracy 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
national way of life + 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
SUM 6 6 6 6 4 6 4  
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
As can be seen, there are only two issues on which populists can be part of an overarching 
policy consensus, namely welfare positive and environmentalism positive. As seen, however, 
the position measures already presented in the boxplots on these issues (fig. 50-51, 52-53) 
indicate entirely different, almost anticyclical behavior, especially between the party 
families of the Populists and the Greens.  
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Fig. 54 – Policy Consensus (Top-3): PP & Non-PP 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The plot (fig. 54), in which the top issues are plotted by duration and weight, underscores 
the difference that generally exists between the populists and the other political parties. The 
first quadrant shows the top of the pops of each side. This comparison indicates the greater 
weight left-wing parties give to their policies, but more importantly, it shows that the two 
sides’ ideological orientation differs. No issue relevant to the populists has comparable 
importance on the other side – and vice versa. 
Fig. 55 – Policy Consensus (Top-3): All PF 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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If we differentiate the plot according to party families (fig. 55), the picture is confirmed. The 
populists have similarities, if any, with the liberal party family and, to some extent, with the 
Conservatives. But concerning the issues that have been particularly relevant over the years 
(first quadrant), similarities with these party families are also absent. 
6.2.4 Ups and downs 
In some policy areas, the difference between the populists and the other parties has widened. 
This observation is particularly true for the topics europe (positive/negative) and 
internationalism (negative). While negative references to the international order have 
dropped significantly among the non-populist parties and the issue thus occupies one of the 
lower ranks (50th place), the populists do not participate in such a growing international 
openness; the topic remains unchanged in the midfield (25th place). The widening is even 
more apparent in the field of European policy. Euroskepticism climbs to one of the front 
ranks (no. 4), while it remains in the bottom third for the other political parties (no. 34); 
likewise, positive references to Europe can be found in the top third without significant 
fluctuations (no. 14). For populists, on the other hand, the positive image of Europe 
continues to fall (38th place), making Europe one of the key differentiators between the party 
families. Meanwhile, the delta amounts to 20 rankings for europe positive and 30 rankings 
for europe negative. 
Fig. 56 – Increasing distance: PPs Fig. 57 – Increasing distance: All NPPs 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The following table provides a list of the ups and downs (tab. 13). It also shows that the three 
items of growing polarization are contrasted by only one example where the ideological gaps 
have narrowed, namely in the national way of life (positive). While positive references to 
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one’s own national culture have always been among the top issues for populists (rank 3), it 
has generally gained momentum among the other party families in recent years, rising from 
rank 31 to 18 (app. 4.4). Nevertheless, a gap of 13 ranking places remains.  
The differences are also in this order of magnitude for those issues that have established 
themselves as fixed parameters, with no further loss or gain in importance over time. For 
populists, this includes law and order (rank 3-2 / NPP: 11-8), for Non-Populists equality 
(rank 2-3 / PP: 17-14). As the top issues of the respective side, they make a significant 
contribution to the programmatic profile. Simultaneously, they also serve to differentiate 
between the parties: Populists often take a skeptical view of inclusion, while left-wing parties 
generally do not favor policies that are tough on crime. 












traditional morality + x     
labour groups - x     
military +  x    
multiculturalism -  x    
internationalism -   x   
europe -   x   
europe +   x   
law and order +    x  
equality +    x  
education -    x  
national way of life +     x 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The ‘winners’ on both sides include multiculturalism negative (PP: 28-11 / NPP: 45-31) and 
military positive (PP: 23-16 / NPP: 36-27), both issues that undoubtedly play into the hands 
of the populists and enable them to differentiate themselves from left-wing and progressive 
parties sharply. Among the losers is traditional morality positive (app. 4.2), which also 
experienced a sharp drop in the populist rankings (PP: 1-15 / NPP: 21-32). Like the slippage 
of the labor groups (PP: 40-48 / NPP: 54-53), which probably reflects the general loss of 
power of trade unions in Europe, the loss of importance of traditional moral concepts is 
perhaps due primarily to the spirit of the times. 
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7 Contagion Hypothesis 
The contagion hypothesis is a follow-up to the previous gap of representation hypothesis. It 
states that the electoral gains of populist parties are an incentive for other parties to react to 
this situation by adopting the policy stands of the populist. Ideally, the design differentiates 
between the following scenarios: first, the anti-establishment positioning with the populist 
party visible on the scene and the opportunity to portray itself as fundamental opposition; 
second, the populist successes at the ballot box. And third, the adaption in which other 
political parties react and adjust to the positions of the populists intending to win back voters. 
This analysis limits its perspective to right-wing populism and wants to measure the so-
called the Rechtsruck within party systems. 
7.1 Operationalization 
The election results measure the success of political parties. We use this indicator 
(MARPOR 2020a: pervote) and correlate the data with the change in other parties’ indices 
or party families to capture other political parties’ possible reaction. The logic is the 
following: 
t0  The populist party achieves a particular election result. This is known to the non-populist parties 
whose reaction is to be explored, and these … 
t1 …can adjust their offer for the next election. 
The changes in the index scores on the side of the non-populist parties at time t1 are 
correlated with the populist election result from t0. Thghis way we hope to identify a possible 
adjustment to the populist election result. 
In line with the contagion hypothesis, the focus is on the Conservative party family. As a 
party family on the right-wing ideological spectrum, they are closest to the populists. 
Specifically, the following correlations were examined and generally calculated using 
analog-linear regressions: 
Cons ~ PP: Correlation of the change in RILE-scores (RILEchange) of each conservative party with the 
election result (PPvotes) of each populist party within the same party system. 
Cons ~ sum(PP): correlation of the change in RILE-scores of each conservative party with the summed 
election result of all populist parties within the same party system. 
mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP): correlation of the average change in RILE-scores of all conservative parties 
with the summed election result of all populist party within the same party system. 
mean(Cons) ~ PP: Correlation of the average change in RILE scores of all conservative parties with the 
electoral performance of each populist party within the same party system. 
Analogously to this procedure regarding the Conservative party family (Cons), we determine 
the position changes of the other party families, i.e. for the Green (Green), Liberal (Lib), 
Social Democrat (SocD) and Socialist (Soc) party families. As for the Rechstruck within the 
party systems, we determine the index mean values of all non-populists as a whole (AllNPP). 




The following table (tab. 14) shows the results of the respective correlations. However, it 
does not indicate a correlation for any of the indices used: RILE, ECO, CULT and POSTM.18 
What if the reaction is less ideological, but more an undirected response? Because of this 
possibility, we repeat the calculation, but use for absolute values to determine the potential 
change in the policy positions. The table shows some significant values (tab. 15), but the 
dispersion remains strong; moreover, the effects are essentially attributable to a few 
countries (especially Italy). 
Tab. 14 – CONS: Reactions of Populist Elections Results (Rechtsruck) 
Indix score ~ vote cor p-value n 
RILE Cons ~ PP -0.01 0.90 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) -0.07 0.53 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) -0.10 0.49 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP -0.02 0.85 70 
ECO Cons ~ PP -0.01 0.94 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) 0.03 0.83 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) 0.02 0.88 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP -0.03 0.80 70 
CULT Cons ~ PP -0.04 0.72 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) -0.12 0.30 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) -0.17 0.25 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP -0.06 0.64 70 
POSTM Cons ~ PP -0.01 0.91 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) -0.08 0.49 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) -0.07 0.64 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP -0.01 0.90 70 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
  
                                                 
18 The plot does not provide any further clues either. See for example the plots for the RILE and CULT index 
(app. 5). 
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Tab. 15 – CONS: Reactions of Populist Elections Results 
  score ~ vote cor p-value n 
RILE Cons ~ PP 0.13 0.21 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) 0.38 0.00 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) 0.50 0.00 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP 0.16 0.20 70 
ECO Cons ~ PP 0.08 0.45 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) 0.02 0.85 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) 0.09 0.57 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP 0.16 0.19 70 
CUL Cons ~ PP -0.04 0.69 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) 0.13 0.27 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) 0.20 0.17 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP -0.05 0.67 70 
POSTM Cons ~ PP 0.10 0.31 99 
  Cons ~ sum(PP) 0.22 0.06 72 
  mean(Cons) ~ sum(PP) 0.28 0.05 47 
  mean(Cons) ~ PP 0.13 0.28 70 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
For illustration purposes, the following plots the RILE index’s and POSTM index’s values. 
The left side shows the plots without directional responses (fig. 58-62); the right side 
displays them with directional responses (fig. 59-63). 
Fig. 58 – RILE: Cons ~ sum(PP) (abs.) Fig. 59 – RILE: Cons ~ sum(PP) 
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Fig. 60 – RILE: mean(Cons) ~  
sum(PP) (abs.) 
Fig. 61 – RILE: mean(Cons) ~  
sum(PP) 
  
Fig. 62 – POSTM: mean(Cons) ~  
sum(PP) (abs.) 
Fig. 63 – POSTM: mean(Cons) ~  
sum(PP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
The scatter-plot on right side (fig. 59-63) show no significant values whatsorever. On the 
left side (fig. 58-62), correlations in the case of RILE can be traced primarily due to the 
“Italian dots.” In the case of POSTM, a rudimentary correlation is discernible in that the 
changes on the materialism v. post-materialism dimension also increase with rising election 
results, albeit with an overall overly broad, almost diffuse scattering.  
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Against this background, it is not very surprising that the search for a correlation between 
possible policy changes of all non-populists (measured by the mean values) and the election 
results of the populists yields hardly anything (tab. 16). 
Tab. 16 – Reactions of Populist Elections Results (Rechtsruck): NPP 
  score ~ vote cor p-value n 
RILE mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.11 0.42 53 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.02 0.84 83 
ECO mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.27 0.05 53 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.11 0.30 83 
CUL mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.04 0.80 53 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.02 0.88 83 
POSTM mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.11 0.44 53 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.03 0.80 83 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
A single significant value can be observed, namely in the ECO index. Since this value’s 
ideological direction points to a sales movement to the left, it can hardly be understood as a 
sign of a shift to the right. In this case, too, the country effect (Italy) is visible (app. 5). 
Tab. 17 – Reactions of Populist Elections Results (Switzerland): NPP 
  score ~ vote Cor p-value n 
RILE mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.71 0.07 7 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.22 0.39 18 
ECO mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.61 0.14 7 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.15 0.56 18 
CUL mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.19 0.68 7 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP 0.02 0.93 18 
POSTM mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) -0.31 0.49 7 
  mean(AllNPP) ~ PP -0.14 0.58 18 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
A breakdown by country is not sensible due to the small number of cases. The exception is 
Switzerland (tab. 17). And indeed, one of the RILE values is almost significant. But the plot 
(app. 5) allows two different interpretations, which is why this example also has no 
significance. The same applies to correlations with individual party families (app. 5) 
Finally, we briefly consider whether populists, for their part, react to the election results of 
other parties. In the case of right-wing populists, we analyze they respond to their 
competitors in the right-wing camp. As can be seen, however, the following table (tab. 18) 
does not provide any indications of this. 
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Tab. 18 – Populistist Reactions to CONS & LIB  
  score ~ vote cor p_value n 
RILE PP ~ LibCons -0.03 0.62 210 
  PP ~ sum(LibCons) -0.06 0.62 69 
  mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons) 0.03 0.86 49 
  mean(PP) ~ LibCons 0.01 0.95 151 
ECO PP ~ LibCons -0.01 0.93 210 
  PP ~ sum(LibCons) -0.02 0.84 69 
  mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons) 0.00 0.99 49 
  mean(PP) ~ LibCons -0.02 0.79 151 
CUL PP ~ LibCons -0.02 0.82 210 
  PP ~ sum(LibCons) 0.13 0.28 69 
  mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons) 0.12 0.41 49 
  mean(PP) ~ LibCons 0.01 0.88 151 
POSTM PP ~ LibCons 0.02 0.78 210 
  PP ~ sum(LibCons) 0.04 0.76 69 
  mean(PP) ~ sum(LibCons) 0.04 0.78 49 
  mean(PP) ~ LibCons 0.06 0.49 151 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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8. Polarization Hypothesis 
The analysis of representation gaps has already provided evidence of growing polarization 
within different policy areas. In this section, we will now examine whether the party-political 
organization of populism promotes the polarization of party systems in Europe. Again, and 
again, the fragmentation of individual party systems is referred to in this context. In 
Germany, for example, the degree of fragmentation at the federal level is now as high as it 
was at the time of the first Bundestag elections in 1949-with the result that the difficulties of 
forming a stable government are growing. This circumstance is likely to fuel disenchantment 
with politics, from which fringe parties, extremist parties, and populist parties tend to benefit. 
Therefore, it is worth looking at the functioning of party systems, whose integrative power 
suffers to the extent that polarization grows in conjunction with fragmentation. Is there a 
connection between the rise of populist parties and the fragmentation of party systems? And 
is there a connection between polarization and fragmentation? These questions are at the 
heart of what follows. 
8.1 Operationalization 
Wie lassen sich die Phänomene der Polarisierung und Fragmentierung fassen und mit dem 
Populismus in Bezug setzen? Den Ausgangspunkt stellt zunächst einmal das Phänomen der 
Polarisierung dar; im Anschluss daran wird die Fragmentierung näher bestimmt, um beide 
Befinde im Anschluss daran in Beziehung zu setzen.  
(1) Polarization: We define polarization as the parties’ ideological distance at the poles of 
the respective party system. And the ideological distance is measured by the RILE range, 
and the other indix ranges. As for an answer to the question of a general tendency toward 
polarization, we need to correlate the ranges with the course of time (election years), in fact 
on two levels: First, in aggregate form looking at party families; second, broken down by 
country. In this context, it is also essential to clarify whether we find populists at the poles 
of the ideological spectrum at all. This is done, among other things, by counting which of 
the various party families occupies the marginal positions within a party system.  
(2) Fragmentation: Analogous to polarization, we must also ask whether we can speak of a 
general tendency toward fragmentation for this phenomenon. The Laakso-Tageperaa index, 
which has already been presented (see 6.1), is used for this purpose. This index measures the 
effective number of parties (ENP) in parliament. 






n: Number of parties with at least 1 seat in parliament 
p: Share of the election result of the ith party in the election result of all parties with at least 1 seat in 
parliament. 
Fragmentation is again carried out at two levels: First, for the party families in aggregate 
form; and second, for the respective party systems per country. On this basis, we address the 
question of whether there is a correlation between fragmentation and the number of populist 
parties. Here, the means of choice is a correlation between the ENP index, and the proportion 
of votes cast for populist parties.  
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(3) Polarization and fragmentation: Based on the ENP determination and the distance 
analysis qua RILE index, the relationship’s question can then be addressed: Is there a 
relationship between fragmentation and polarization? And what part do populist parties play 
in this? With the following statistical methods we will answer these questions: first, a 
correlation between RILE score range and ENP, and second, a (multiple) linear regression. 
(4) Bipolarity: Finally, we deal with the question of whether polarization within the party 
systems (also) finds expression in an intensified formation of camps. This requires answering 
the thorny question of how a political camp can be defined. Two approaches have been 
developed for this purpose, which will be used in the analysis: 
 On the one hand, a camp can be determined by the party system’s mean (MPS), 
whereby the mean is not weighted by the election result (it is a matter of the supply 
of ideology, not its demand). On this basis, all parties to the right of the MPS mean 
belong to the right camp, and all parties to the left of the mean belong to the left 
camp. The following questions are then at the heart of the analysis: does the mean 
shift over time? And does the distance between the means of the left and right camps 
increase? 
 Second, we position the political parties along a spectrum with the respective indices. 
The largest gap in the middle of the spectrum is defined then as a moat separating 
the two camps. At the heart of this approach is the question of whether and to what 
extent moats grow over time. 




The table reports the correlations between the range of the four indices - RILE, ECO, CULT, 
POSTM - and the passage of time in election years. Does the range increase over time? And 
can we thus speak of a growing polarization among party families? No, we find no 
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Tab. 19 – Growing Polarization of Party Systems  
Indices  cor p-value 
RILE-Range ~ election_year -0.06 0.575 
ECO-Range ~ election_year -0.07 0.560 
CULT-Range ~ election_year 0.12 0.310 
POSTM-Range ~ election_year 0.20 0.071 
Source: MARPOR 2020a. 
The country-level is somewhat more informative. Like the aggregation level, several 
correlations can be assumed - for example, in the case of Sweden, which only just missed a 
significant value (.67) in the case of the POSTM (fig. 65). However, in the absence of 
sufficient significance, this largely remains mere conjecture. But there are a few tangible 
exceptions (app. 6.1):  
 RILE: Sweden (-.81); CULT: Denmark (.81); ECO: Sweden (-.70); POSTM: 
Denmark (.67), Switzerland (.84). 
In two of the five cases, polarization decreases over time. In the other three cases, it 
increases. This hardly justifies speaking of a general trend of polarization. Nevertheless, 
these examples provide indications that polarization is primarily “cultural.” In this respect, 
the Swedish case on the dimension of materialism v. post-materialism also has a particular 
significance because the logic of polarization is evident here, which is not evident for 
Sweden in the RILE and ECO indices because of the direction of the correlation points in 
precisely the opposite direction. 
Fig. 65 – Growing Polarization: POSTM-Range (Countries) 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
If the findings regarding polarization at the country level are somewhat mixed, at least the 
question of populists and their ideological position within the party systems can be answered 
relatively clearly. They are indeed on the fringes, both in the right-left spectrum as “right-
wingers” and in the other dimensions (CULT, ECO, and POSTM). Among the progressive 
parties, this position changes: The Socialists occupy this marginal position in the RILE and 
ECO indexes; the Greens in the CULT and POSTM.  
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Tab. 20 – Polarization: Right-most and Left-most Parties 
 Indices   Populists GRN LIB SocD Soc Cons 
RILE 
max. 50.0 0.0 22.6 1.6 0.0 29.0 
min. 1.6 27.4 0.0 22.6 50.0 3.2 
CUL 
max. 75.8 0.0 8.1 3.2 0.0 19.4 
min. 0.0 72.6 4.8 8.1 17.7 1.6 
ECO 
max. 30.6 1.6 35.5 4.8 0.0 30.6 
min. 6.5 22.6 1.6 22.6 45.2 6.5 
POSTM 
max. 77.4 1.6 9.7 1.6 1.6 11.3 
min. 0.0 72.6 8.1 6.5 16.1 1.6 
Source: MARPOR 2020a. 
In the CULT and POSTM dimensions the max/min values are recognizably higher than those 
of RILE and ECO, which is why we can assume that the actual drivers of polarization are to 
be found here. And it also stands to reason to attribute particular importance to the populists 
for the polarization of party competition due to their quadruple marginal position in the 
various dimensions. Some indications of this are provided by the indices’ correlations (score-
ranges) with the populists’ vote share. 
Tab. 21 – Polarization: Indices Score-Range ~ PP-Vote 
  cor p-value 
RILE-Range -0.08 0.43 
CULT-Range -0.10 0.33 
ECO-Range -0.07 0.50 
POSTM-Range -0.07 0.51 
Source: MARPOR 2020a. 
 
At the aggregate level, these are unproductive (tab. 21). At the country level, however, some 
findings can be compiled (app. 6.1). In a few countries, polarization increases with the 
strength of the populists. In these cases, the values are not only significant but also reflect a 
strong correlation:  
 CULT: Denmark (.78), Netherlands (.72), Italy (-.50); ECO: Netherlands (.92); 
POSTM: Denmark (. 81). 
We take these findings as an indication that populists have a sometimes considerable 
polarization potential for party competition.19 
8.2.2 Fragmention 
Like polarization, we find no general trend toward fragmentation of political party systems 
(tab. 22). At the country level, things are different (fig. 66). Five of the ten selected party 
systems are affected by growing fragmentation. 
Tab. 22 – Growing Fragmentation: ENP  
                                                 
19 Italy is the exception here. But the Italian party system has the peculiarity of comprising several populist 
parties, which in turn have very different ideological orientations. 
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 election_year ~ ENP election_year ~ n(parties) 
corr 0.18 0.16 
p-value 0.109 0.166 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Countries, where the degree of fragmentation of the party system is increasing include 
Sweden (.85), Denmark (.93), Finland (.84), the Netherlands (.76), and Germany (.71). 
Fig. 66 – Fragmentation: ENP (Countries) 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Moreover, these fragmentation processes are also related to the populists. This is indicated 
by the ENP index correlation with the share of votes for the party family of pop-up lists 
(app. 6.2), indicating a weak but significant correlation (.26). And this finding is 
corroborated by counting the individual party systems in a country overview (app. 6.2). 
8.2.3 Fragmentation and Polarization 
Is there also a connection between fragmentation and polarization? And what part do 
populist parties play in this? The four indices are again used and correlated with the ENP 
index to answer this question. The results are consistently significant, and the correlations 
are at least in the moderate range (tab. 23). Therefore, this question about a correlation 
between the two phenomena can be answered in the affirmative: there is a correlation, which 
is presumably also reciprocal.  
Tab. 23 – Polarization & Fragmentation: Indices and ENP 
Indices/Correlations Cor p-value 
RILE-Range ~ ENP 0.42 0.000 
CUL-Range ~ ENP 0.61 0.000 
ECO-Range ~ ENP 0.47 0.000 
POSTM-Range ~ ENP 0.61 0.000 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. 67 – Polarization & Fragmentation: 
POSTM-Range ~ ENP 
(Plotted lines: connection between the predicted points) 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Polarization creates incentives for centrifugal party competition, in which the battle is not 
for voters in the center but voters in the respective camp. This usually favors small parties 
that can present themselves as authentic representatives of “expressive voting.” Such 
centrifugal party competition has polarizing consequences because it furthers outbidding 
among the parties within a camp. 
However, we can make no further statistically reliable statements about this triangle of 
fragmentation, polarization, and strength of populist parties. In any case, the additional 
knowledge that populist parties are also in the party system – in addition to the knowledge 
of the ENP – does not contribute to a more reliable prediction: The p-values are not 
significant (Pr(>|t|), see tab. 24) and the effect of the PP factor is irrelevant, as can be seen 
from the plotted lines (fig. 67). 
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Tab. 24 – Polarization & Fragmentation: POSTM-range ~ ENP (+ PP) 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
POSTM-range  
~ ENP 
(Intercept) -0.2 9.7 -0.02 0.98 
ENP 13.9 2.0 6.81 0.00 
r-squared 0.38       
adjusted r-squared 0.37       
p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
POSTM-range  
~ ENP + PP 
(Intercept) -1.4 9.7 -0.15 0.88 
ENP 12.8 2.3 5.69 0.00 
PP 7.9 7.0 1.14 0.26 
r-squared 0.39       
adjusted r-squared 0.37       
p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
8.2.4 Bipolarity 
Finally, we need to address whether polarization may also be expressed in the form of 
(intensified) camp formation. Two approaches have been developed for this purpose: First, 
the mean party system (MPS) approach, and second, the maximum difference (MD) 
approach. Linear regressions have been calculated for both methods to measure the stock 
formation based on the different indices (RILE, CULT, ECO, and POSTM) and second to 
estimate the PP factor’s weight.20  
Fig. 68 – Bipolarity: MD/RILE Fig. 69 – Bipolarity: MD/CULT 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
                                                 
20 An exemplary presentation of the two regressions can be found in the appendix for the RILE index (app. 6.4). 
The lists of results for the different correlations can also be found there.  
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As a result, however, the findings are relatively meager. No significant values can be found 
for the variant MPS. The alternative variant MD at least has significant correlations, but 
these are illustrated in the two plots. These are based on the one hand on the RILE (fig. 68), 
and on the other hand on the CULT index (fig. 69). 
As can be seen, both plots show a significant negative correlation that is equally weak in 
both cases (cor = -.23, p-value = .04; app. 6.4). Thus, the difference between the camps tends 
to decrease over time as the regression line indicates. Moreover, the red line provides a 
heuristic impression of the PP factor’s relevance, which is not significant in either case (and 
lacks significance). At the country level, there are only a few significant findings to add, 
which, moreover, contradict the assumption of camp formation: 
 RILE/MSP: Schweden (-.79), Niederlande (-.88); 
 RILE/MD (standardized): Finnland (-.72). 
In sum, we find that the party systems’ constellation does not reflect an increasing 
polarization. 
  




This contribution to the DEMOS project is to investigate the relationship of populists to the 
content dimension of politics. It aims to answer whether populist parties change their 
programmatic perspectives once they are in power (WP 5.1). Also, it examines the influence 
they exert on other political parties and the party system (WP 6.3). To this end, we have 
conducted several analyses at different levels: inter-party family comparisons and intra-party 
family comparisons. The following sections summarize the main findings with a view to the 
four central hypotheses.  
9.1 Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis 
Due to the numerous approaches to analyzing this hypothesis, the following chart provides 
an overview of the main findings of the analyses: 
Tab. 25 – Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis: Findings 
Questions Findings Focus 
Do Populists have core policies? 
Yes, but less prioritized than, e.g., the 
Greens. 
Inter 
Do Populists have a stable ranking of 
their priorities? 
Yes, but less clear-cut than the average 
of all non-populists. 
Inter 
Do Populists switch easily between 
“hot” topics? 
Not really; Populists stick to their guns. Inter 
Do Populists ignore policies? Not more than other parties. Inter 
Do Populists switch easily between 
“lame” policy issues? 
No, they do not. Inter 
Is the Populist party family internally 
policy-divers? 
Yes, more than parties center-left, but 
not more than parties center-right. 
Intra 
Do Populists switch between their 
priorities? 
Yes, more than parties center-right in 
terms of the top-3 priorities.  
Intra 
 
9.2 Power Matters Hypothesis 
(1) Populists’ experience in government is not without consequences in some policy areas. 
We find expected effects in the areas of political corruption and political authority. Whereas 
these effects demonstrate a “opportunistic” behavior, results in other fields suggest learning 
effects because of the time in government. Cases in point are the items (economic) incentives 
and middle class and professional groups. In these cases, the populists do not return to their 
pre-government positions. Instead, their post-government positions’ data suggest that the 
populists become more “established” because of the government period. 
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(2) Moreover, some populist issues are determined by the government-opposition 
distinction. These include traditional morality (positive), democracy, and economic 
orthodoxy. While Populists see traditional morality positive and democracy as practical 
opposition issues, economic orthodoxy seems to serve as a typical “government-friendly” 
issue, even for populists in power.  
(3) The impression that populist parties approach the profile of established parties through 
government is also evident in the intra-party family comparison of populists. Without 
government experience, populists become “more populist” than their counterparts from 
parties with government experience. And these differences are evident in both socio-cultural 
and socio-economic terms. Moreover, the East-West comparison is striking: Populists from 
Central and Eastern Europe tend to appear more pragmatic. 
9.3 Gap of Representation Hypothesis 
(1) With the populists’ electoral success, they represent new issues in Parliament. However, 
the picture is mixed due to the strong effects of country-specific differences. In sum, the 
result shows the vital relevance of socio-cultural issues. From the populists’ point of view, 
the central representation gap is the emergence of a mainstream for which they want to offer 
an alternative. A particularly prominent example of this is the positive reference to the 
national way of life (positive).  
(2) Closely related to the cultural dimension is the area of international politics, including 
Europe. The decidedly Euroskeptical attitude (europe negative) contributes significantly to 
the profile of populists, who differ in this respect from liberals and conservatives. Moreover, 
populists take a hostile stance toward growing internationalization. The rejection of 
multiculturalism in the national sphere finds its logical continuation in the nation-state’s 
advocacy in the international sphere.  
(3) In general, populists oppose a policy consensus that emphasizes the inclusion side of 
politics, both in the national and international spheres. Populists want to distance themselves 
from this pro-inclusion policy, which is advocated primarily by left-wing parties but is also 
widely supported by the liberal-conservative party camp. And they want to offer a political 
alternative. Some of these “alternative” policies also encompass classic welfare items, but 
they manifest themselves primarily in the rejection of post-materialist policies. Populists are 
particularly opposed to these policies. 
(4) There is hardly any support for this opposition in the other party families. And the 
different conjunctures found for various issues on both sides hardly change this overall 
picture. Instead, it shows that the populists want to be at the forefront of the zeitgeist that 
rejects the left-liberal-green mainstream. They want to lead the counter-revolution (Ignazi) 
formed in recent decades in reaction to post-materialism.  
9.4 Contagion Hypothesis.  
In the context of the contagion hypothesis, the various approaches have revealed few robust 
results that would warrant confirmation of the hypothesis. This area may require some in-
depth qualitative drilling beyond the scope of this analysis. 
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9.5 Polarization Hypothesis 
(1) The data does not provide evidence for a general tendency toward polarization, nor for a 
general trend toward fragmentation. However, at the country level, we could gather several 
indications supporting a growing polarization and fragmentation. Moreover, the data 
demonstrate the relationship between fragmentation and polarization, presumably in the 
form of mutually reinforcing effects.  
(2) Moreover, the findings confirm the assumption that populists find themselves at the party 
systems’ poles. The CULT and POSTM indices, in particular, underscore their outsider 
position. Moreover, these indices reinforce the findings that a new cleavage separates parties 
open to inclusion from populists, who advocate exclusion-oriented policies in many areas. 
(3) Overall, we could not condense the findings into a model that provides statistical 
evidence for the populists’ share of polarization. Nor could we demonstrate an increased 
formation of camps as an expression of polarization. 
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1. Data Set and Indices 
1.1 MARPOR [ad 3.1] 
Tab. A-1 – PSW-Sample: PP 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11951 New Democracy NyD 
Sweden 11710 Sweden Democrats SD 
Denmark 13951 Progress Party FP 
Denmark 13720 Danish People’s Party DF 
Finland 14820 True Finns / Finnish Rural Party PS / SMP 
Netherlands 22430 Livable Netherlands LN 
Netherlands 22720 List Pim Fortuyn LPF 
Netherlands 22722 Party of Freedom PVV 
Netherlands 22730 Forum for Democracy FvD 
France 31720 National Front FN 
Italy 32710 
National Alliance / Italian Social Movement-National 
Right AN / MSI-DN 
Italy 32720 League / Northern League L / LN 
Italy 32610 Go Italy FI 
Italy 32629 House of Freedom   
Italy 32061 People of Freedom PdL 
Italy 32630 




Italy 32956 Five Star Movement M5S 
Germany 41953 Alternative for Germany AfD 
Austria 42420 Austrian Freedom Party / Freedom Movement FPÖ /  
Austria 42710 Alliance for the Future of Austria BZÖ 
Austria 42951 Team Stronach for Austria TS 
Switzerland 43710 Swiss Democrats SD/DS 
Switzerland 43711 Federal Democratic Union EDU/UDF 
Switzerland 43810 Swiss People’s Party SVP/UDC 
Switzerland 43902 Geneva Citizens’ Movement MCG 
United 
Kingdom 51951 United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-2 – PSW-Sample: GRN 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11110 Green Ecology Party MP 
Denmark 13230 Socialist People’s Party SF 
Denmark 13110 Alternativ   
Finland 14110 Green Union VL 
Netherlands 22110 Green Left GL 
Netherlands 22951 Party for the Animals PvdD 
France 31110 Europe Ecology - The Greens / The Greens 
EÉLV / Les 
Verts 
France 31111 Ecology Generation GE 
Italy 32110 Green Federation FdV 
Italy 32111 The Girasole (‘Sunflower’)   
Germany 41112 Greens/Alliance’90 Greens/90 
Germany 41113 Alliance’90/Greens 90/Greens 
Austria 42110 The Greens / Green Alternative GRÜNE / GA 
Austria 42120 Peter Pilz List PILZ 
Switzerland 43110 Green Party of Switzerland GPS/PES 
Switzerland 43321 Independents’ Alliance LdU/AdI 
Switzerland 43120 Green Liberal Party GLP 
United 
Kingdom 51110 Green Party of England and Wales GPEW 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-3 – PSW-Sample: LIB 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11420 Liberals / Liberal People’s Party L / FP 
Sweden 11810 Centre Party CP 
Denmark 13410 Danish Social-Liberal Party RV 
Denmark 13420 Liberals V 
Denmark 13001 Liberal Alliance / New Alliance  / NY 
Finland 14420 Liberal People’s Party LKP 
Finland 14810 Finnish Centre SK 
Finland 14901 Swedish People’s Party RKP/SFP 
Finland 14430 Young Finnish Party NSP 
Finland 14440 Movement Now   
Netherlands 22330 Democrats’66 D’66 
Netherlands 22420 People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy VVD 
France 31421 Radical Party PR 
France 31425 Republic Onwards!   
Italy 32310 
Pannella-Sgarbi List / Pannella-Riformatori List / 
Pannella List  / LP 
Italy 32410 Italian Republican Party PRI 
Italy 32420 Italian Liberal Party PLI 
Italy 32321 Italian Renewal RI 
Italy 32421 Daisy - Democracy is Freedom M-DL 
Italy 32460 Civic Choice SC 
Italy 32451 More Europe E 
Germany 41420 Free Democratic Party FDP 
Austria 42421 Liberal Forum LIF 
Austria 42430 
The New Austria and Liberal Forum / The New 
Austria NEOS 
Switzerland 43420 FDP.The Liberals / Radical Democratic Party 
FDP/PLR / 
FDP/PRD 
Switzerland 43531 Liberal Party of Switzerland LPS/PLS 
Switzerland 43120 Green Liberal Party GLP 
United 
Kingdom 51421 Liberal Democrats LibDems 
United 
Kingdom 51430 Alliance Party of Northern Ireland Alliance 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-4 – PSW-Sample: CONS 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11520 
Christian Democrats / Christian Democratic 
Community Party Kd / KdS 
Sweden 11620 Moderate Coalition Party MSP 
Denmark 13330 Centre Democrats CD 
Denmark 13520 Christian Democrats / Christian People’s Party K / KrF 
Finland 14520 
Christian Democrats in Finland / Finnish Christian 
Union KD / SKL 
Finland 14620 National Coalition KK 
Netherlands 22521 Christian Democratic Appeal CDA 
Netherlands 22526 Christian Union CU 
France 31624 
Democratic Movement / Union for French 
Democracy MoDem / UDF 
France 31625 Rally for the Republic RPR 
France 31626 
The Republicans / Union for a Popular Movement / 
Union for the Presidential Majority  / UMP 
France 31630 New Centre NC 
France 31631 Centrist Alliance AC 
France 31430 Union of Democrats and Independents UDI 
Italy 32520 Italian Popular Party / Christian Democrats PPI / DC 
Italy 32528 Pact for Italy PI 
Italy 32521 Christian Democratic Centre CCD 
Italy 32522 White Flower   
Italy 32901 European Democracy DE 
Italy 32530 
Union of the Center / Union for Christian and Center 
Democrats UdC / UDC 
Italy 32904 South Tyrolean People’s Party SVP 
Italy 32952 Italy in the World InM 
Italy 32953 Popular Democratic Union for Europe P-UDEUR 
Italy 32640 Labour and Freedom List 3L 
Italy 32051 Popular Civic List CP 
Italy 32055 Us with Italy NcL 
Italy 32090 
Coalition of South Tyrolean People’s Party and 
Trentino Tyrolean Autonomist Party SVP-PATT 
Germany 41521 Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union CDU/CSU 
Austria 42520 Austrian People’s Party ÖVP 
Switzerland 43520 Christian Democratic People’s Party of Switzerland CVP/PDC 
Switzerland 43811 Conservative Democratic Party of Switzerland BDP/PBD 
United 
Kingdom 51620 Conservative Party Conservatives 
United 
Kingdom 51621 Ulster Unionist Party UUP 
United 
Kingdom 51903 Democratic Unionist Party DUP 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-5 – PSW-Sample: SocD 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11320 Social Democratic Labour Party SAP 
Denmark 13320 Social Democratic Party SD 
Finland 14320 Finnish Social Democrats SSDP 
Netherlands 22320 Labour Party PvdA 
France 31320 Socialist Party PS 
Italy 32220 Democrats of the Left / Democratic Party of the Left DS / PDS 
Italy 32320 Italian Socialist Party PSI 
Italy 32330 Italian Democratic Socialist Party PSDI 
Italy 32529 Democratic Alliance AD 
Italy 32111 The Girasole (‘Sunflower’)   
Italy 32329 Olive Tree   
Italy 32611 New Italian Socialist Party NPSI 
Italy 32221 Rose in the Fist RnP 
Italy 32903 Autonomy Liberty Democracy (Aosta Valley) ALD 
Italy 32955 The Union – Prodi   
Italy 32440 Democratic Party PD 
Italy 32031 Free and Equal LeU 
Germany 41320 Social Democratic Party of Germany SPD 
Austria 42320 Austrian Social Democratic Party SPÖ 
Switzerland 43320 Social Democratic Party of Switzerland SPS/PSS 
Switzerland 43321 Independents’ Alliance LdU/AdI 
Switzerland 43540 Christian Social Party CSP/PCS 
United 
Kingdom 51320 Labour Party Labour 
United 
Kingdom 51902 Scottish National Party SNP 
United 
Kingdom 51340 Social Democratic and Labour Party SDLP 
United 
Kingdom 51901 The Party of Wales PC 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-6 – PSW-Sample: SOC 
Country ID (MARPOR) Party name Abbreviation 
Sweden 11220 Left Party V 
Denmark 13229 Red-Green Unity List EL 
Finland 14223 Left Wing Alliance VAS 
Netherlands 22220 Socialist Party SP 
France 31220 French Communist Party PCF 
France 31021 Left Front FDG 
France 31230 Left Radical Party PRG 
France 31240 Indomitable France   
Italy 32212 Communist Refoundation Party PRC 
Italy 32213 Party of Italian Communists PdCI 
Italy 32021 Civil Revolution RC 
Italy 32230 Left Ecology Freedom SEL 
Germany 41221 Party of Democratic Socialism PDS 
Germany 41222 The Left. Party of Democratic Socialism L-PDS 
Germany 41223 The Left LINKE 
Austria 42220 Austrian Communist Party KPÖ 
Switzerland 43220 Swiss Labour Party PdAS/PdTS 
Switzerland 43020 Together on the Left EAG 
United 
Kingdom 51210 We Ourselves SF 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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1.2 RILE and Other Indices [ad 3.2] 
Composition of the RILE index  
RILE-ScoreRight = per104 + per201 + per203 + per305 + per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 + 
per601 + per603 + per605 + per606 [military +| + |freedom & human rights| + |constitution +| + |political 
authority| + |free market economy| + |incentives| + |protectionism -| + |economic orthodoxy| + |welfare -| + 
|national way of life +| + |traditional morality +| + |law and order +| + |civic mindedness +]  
RILE-ScoreLeft = per103 + per105 + per106 + per107 + per403 + per404 + per406 + per412 + per413 + 
per504 + per506 + per701 + per202 [anti-imperalism] + |military -] + |peace] + |internationalism +] + 
|democracy] + |market regulation] + |economic planning] + |protectionism +] + |controlled economy] + 
|nationalisation] + |welfare +] + |education +] + |labour groups +] 
Composition of the CULT index  
CULTRight = per104 + per109 + per601 + per603 + per605 + per608 [military +| + |internationalism -| + 
|national way of life +| + |traditional morality +| + |law and order +| + |multiculturalism -]  
CULTLeft = per105 + per106 + per107 + per501 + per503 + per602 + per604 + per607 + per705 [military 
-| + |peace| + |internationalism +| + |environmentalism +| + |equality +| + |national way of life -| + 
|traditional morality -| + |multiculturalism +| + |minority groups] 
Composition of the ECO index  
ECORight = per401 + per402 + per407 + per414 + per505 [free market economy| + |incentives| + 
|protectionism -| + |economic orthodoxy| + |welfare -] 
ECOLeft = per403 + per404 + per405 + per406 + per409 + per412 + per413 + per415 + per416 + per504 
[market regulation| + |economic planning| + |corporatism/mixed economy| + |protectionism +| + 
|keynesian demand management| + |controlled economy| + |nationalisation| + |marxist analysis +| + |anti-
growth economy +| + |welfare +] 
Composition of the POSTM index  
POSTMRight = per104 + per109 + per110 + per304 + per305 + per406 + per410 + per601 + per603 + 
per605 + per608 [military +| + |internationalism -| + |europe -| + |political corruption| + |political authority| 
+ |protectionism +| + |economic growth +| + |national way of life +| + |traditional morality +| + |law and 
order +| + |multiculturalism -] 
POSTMLeft = per105 + per107 + per108 + per407 + per416 + per501 + per502 + per503 + per602 + 
per604 + per606 + per607 + per705 + per706 |military -| + |internationalism +| + |europe +| + 
|protectionism -| + |anti-growth economy +| + |environmentalism +| + |culture +| + |equality +| + |national 
way of life -| + |traditional morality -| + |civic mindedness +| + |multiculturalism +| + |minority groups| + 
|non-economic demographic groups] 
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2. Flexible Policy Program Hypothesis [ad 4.] 
2.1 Policy Profiles [ad 4.1] 
Fig. A-1 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & NPP 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-2 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & CONS 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-3 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & GRN 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-4 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & LIB 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-5 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & SOC 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-6 – Policies ordered by mean: PP & SocD 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
2.2 Policy Hopping [ad 4.2] 
Tab. A-8 – Difference between PP and NPP: RILE (Cohen’s d) 
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Populists GRN LIB SocD SOC CONS All NPP 
(n=98) (n=85) (n=118) (n=108) (n=72) (n=134) (n=509) 
RILE 1.94*** 0.56*** 1.66*** 2.55*** 0.60*** 1.14*** 
ECO 1.26*** 0.09 0.94*** 1.69*** 0.21 0.59*** 
CUL 3.15*** 1.59*** 2.10*** 2.78*** 1.11*** 1.73*** 
Source: MARPOR 2020a | *p ≤0.05, **p ≤0.01, ***p ≤0.01. 
Fig. A-7 – RILE: PP v. NPP Fig. A-8 – RILE-Spread: PP v. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-9 – RILE: All PF Fig. A-10 – RILE-Spread: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-11 – CUL: PP v. NPP Fig. A-12 – CUL -Spread: PP v. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-13 – CUL: All PF Fig. A-14 – CUL -Spread: All PF 




Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-15 – ECO: PP v. NPP Fig. A-16 – ECO -Spread: PP v. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-17 – ECO: All PF Fig. A-18 – ECO -Spread: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-19 – POSTM: PP v. NPP Fig. A-20 – POSTM -Spread: PP v. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-21 – POSTM: All PF Fig. A-22 – POSTM -Spread: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-23 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. All-NPP 
Fig. A-24 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. CONS 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-25 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. GRN 
Fig. A-26 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. LIB 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-27 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. SOC 
Fig. A-28 – POSTM and  
POSTM-Spread: PP vs. SocD 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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2.3 Policy Ignorance [ad 4.3] 
Tab. A-9 – Cohen’s: Differences in number of small items 
Items (N ≤) GRN LIB SocD Soc. CONS NPP 
0 
0.06 0.11 0.19 0.02 0.04 0.02 
1 
0.44 0.08 0.09 0.17 0.16 0.05 
2 
0.53 0.06 0.05 0.08 0.11 0.07 
3 
0.31 0.08 0.19 0.03 0.20 0.06 
4 
0.15 0.12 0.17 0.19 0.13 0.10 
5 
0.03 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.24 0.16 
6 
0.18 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.26 
7 
0.11 0.13 0.17 0.35 0.13 0.17 
8 
0.15 0.09 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.08 
9 
0.14 0.17 0.02 0.20 0.09 0.06 
10 
0.21 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.38 0.09 
11 
0.19 0.11 0.12 0.06 0.32 0.11 
12 
0.20 0.14 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.11 
13 
0.22 0.17 0.26 0.04 0.23 0.12 
14 
0.24 0.29 0.26 0.02 0.32 0.17 
15 
0.21 0.26 0.21 0.08 0.32 0.16 
SD of 
policy-
categories       
50 % 0.46 0.09 0.01 0.32 0.02 0.12 
75 % 0.48 0.10 0.01 0.11 0.11 0.09 
80 % 0.62 0.19 0.13 0.25 0.03 0.22 
50 % (0 not 
counted) 0.44 0.41 0.15 0.28 0.24 0.10 
75 % (0 not 
counted) 0.48 0.11 0.02 0.08 0.02 0.11 
80 % (0 not 
counted) 0.20 0.13 0.31 0.02 0.22 0.12 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-29 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. CONS 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-30 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. GRN 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-31 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. LIB 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-32 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. Soc. 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-33 – Share of manifestos/policy mentioned: PP v. SocD 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
2.4 Internal Diversity [ad 4.4] 
Fig. A-34 – Internal Diversity of PF: 
CoV in policy cat.  
Fig. A-35 – Internal Diversity of PF: 
CoV in policy cat. (mean > 1) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-10 –Top-3 for each Populist Party 
Party Country Top-3 







Sweden Democrats Sweden welfare + national way of 
life + 
law and order +  
Progress Party Denmark incentives free market 
economy 
economic goals  




law and order +  
True Finns Finland welfare + democracy equality +  
Livable Netherlands Netherlands technology & 
infrastructure 
education + gov-admin 
efficiency 
 




law and order +  
Party of Freedom Netherlands law and order + multiculturalis
m - 
national way of 
life + 
 
Forum for Democracy Netherlands political 
corruption 
democracy national way of 
life + 
 
National Front France national way of 
life + 
law and order + traditional 
morality + 
 









incentives law and order + 




welfare +  
Alternative for Germany Germany democracy europe - national way of 
life + 
 




equality +  
Alliance for the Future of 
Austria 
Austria law and order + equality + welfare +  














Federal Democratic Union Switzerland traditional 
morality + 
law and order + political 
authority 
 
Swiss People’s Party Switzerland law and order + europe - free market 
economy 
 
Geneva Citizens’ Movement Switzerland law and order + national way of 
life + 





europe - welfare + national way of 
life + 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-11 –Top-3 for each Populist Party (with mean values) 
Party Country Top-3 








Sweden Democrats Sweden welfare + 
15.4 
national way of life + 
10.2 
law and order + 
8.8 
  
Progress Party Denmark incentives 
8.8 









law and order + 
11.4 
  






















law and order + 
7.1 
  
















National Front France national way of life + 
11.1 










law and order + 
7.2 
  

































































Alliance for the Future of 
Austria 





















Federal Democratic Union Switzerland traditional morality + 
37.3 
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Party Country Top-3 








Geneva Citizens’ Movement Switzerland law and order + 
15.3 


















Source: MARPOR 2020a 
3. Power Matters Hypothesis [ad 5] 
3.1 Operationalization [ad 5.1] 
Tab. A-12 – Countries included in PSG 
 n 









FrP Norway 12951 1 6 0 6 
DF Denmark 13720 3 2 1 3 
PS / SMP Finland 14820 1 7 0 7 
AN / MSI-DN Italy 32710 2 2 1 3 
L / LN Italy 32720 3 2 3 5 
FI Italy 32610 2 1 2 3 
PdL Italy 32061 1 0 1 1 
 / FPÖ Austria 42420 2 4 3 7 








Hungary 86421 2 3 2 5 
PiS Poland 92436 1 3 1 4 
SNS Slovakia 96710 3 2 3 5 
HZDS Slovakia 96711 3 1 2 3 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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3.2.Findings [ad 5.2] 
Fig. A-36 – Constitution+ * Constitution−: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. A-37 – Military −: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-38 – Constitution+ * Constitution−: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
Fig. A-39 – Military −: 
Pre-, In, and Post-Government 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-40 – POSTM-Score + (right): 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. A-41 – POSTM: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
  
Sources: MARPOR 2020a Sources: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-42 – Internationalism −: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
Fig. A-43 – Europe +: 
In Government v. In Opposition 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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4. Gap of Representation Hypothesis [ad 6.] 
4.1 New Policies [ad 6.2.1] 
Tab. A-13 – Effective Number of Policies: Cohen’s d 
  Mean sd Cohen’s d p-value 
unweighted 1.49 1.32 0.38 0.04 
weighted 1.27 1.66 0.30 0.10 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
4.2 Gap of Representation [ad 6.2.2] 
Fig. A-44 – Multiculturalism −: PP vs. NPP Fig. A-45 – Law and order +: PP vs. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-46 – Multiculturalism −: All PF Fig. A-47 – Law and order +: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-48 – Equality +: PP vs. NPP Fig. A-49 – Internationalism +: PP vs. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-50 – Equality +: All PF Fig. A-51 – Internationalism +: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-52 – Gov.-Admin. efficiency: 
PP vs. NPP 
Fig. A-53 – Internationalism −: 
PP vs. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-54 – Gov.-Admin. efficiency: 
All PF 
Fig. A-55 – Internationalism −: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-56 – Europe +: PP vs. NPP Fig. A-57 – Labour groups +: PP vs. NPP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-58 – Europe +: All PF Fig. A-59 – Labour groups +: All PF 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-60 – Anomaly Variable: 
Education − (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-61 – Anomaly Variable: 
Labor groups − (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-62 – Anomaly Variable: 
Education − (All PF) 
Fig. A-63 – Anomaly Variable: 
Labor groups − (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-64 – Anomaly Variable: 
Military + (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-65 – Anomaly Variable: 
Traditional morality + (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-66 – Anomaly Variable: 
Military + (All PF) 
Fig. A-67 – Anomaly Variable: 
Traditional morality + (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-68 – Anomaly Variable: 
Anti-growth economy + (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-69 – Anomaly Variable: 
Peace (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-70 – Anomaly Variable: 
Anti-growth economy + (All PF) 
Fig. A-71 – Anomaly Variable: 
Peace (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-72 – Anomaly Variable: 
Traditional Morality − (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-73 – Anomaly Variable: 
National way of life − (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-74 – Anomaly Variable: 
Traditional Morality − (All PF) 
Fig. A-75 – Anomaly Variable: 
National way of life − (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-76 – Anomaly Variable: 
Multiculturalism + (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-77 – Anomaly Variable: 
Military − (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-78 – Anomaly Variable: 
Multiculturalism + (All PF) 
Fig. A-79 – Anomaly Variable: 
Military − (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-80 – Anomaly Variable: 
Environmentalism + (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-81 – Anomaly Variable: 
Welfare − (PP v. NPP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-82 – Anomaly Variable: 
Environmentalism + (All PF) 
Fig. A-83 – Anomaly Variable: 
Welfare − (All PF) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-84 – Anomaly Variable: 
Protectionism + (PP v. NPP) 
Fig. A-85 – Anomaly Variable: 
Protectionism + (All PF) 
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
4.3 Policy Consensus [ad 6.2.3] 
Fig. A-86 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & CONS 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-87 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & SOC 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-88 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & SocD 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-89 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & LIB 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-90 – Policy importance and length of time in the top-3: PP & GRN 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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4.4 Up and Down of Policies [ad 6.2.4] 
Fig. A-91 – Declining topics: PPs Fig. A-92 – Declining topics: All NPPs 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-93 – General Trends: PPs Fig. A-94 – General Trends: All NPPs 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-95 – Reducing the distance: PPs Fig. A-96 – Reducing the distance: All NPPs 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-97 – Keeping the distance: PPs Fig. A-98 – Keeping the distance: All NPPs 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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5. Contagion Hypothesis [ad 7.] 
Fig. A-99 – CONS RILEchanges ~ PPvotes Fig. A-100 – CONS CULchanges ~ PPvotes 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-101 – ECO: mean(AllNPP) ~ sum(PP) Fig. A-102 – Switzerland: mean(AllNPP) ~ 
sum(PP) 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-14 – GRN: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote 
  score ~ vote cor p_value n 
RILE Green ~ PP -0.05 0.66 82 
  Green ~ sum(PP) 0.01 0.95 55 
  mean(Green) ~ sum(PP) 0.01 0.94 47 
  mean(Green) ~ PP -0.02 0.89 67 
ECO Green ~ PP -0.04 0.73 82 
  Green ~ sum(PP) -0.01 0.94 55 
  mean(Green) ~ sum(PP) 0.03 0.86 47 
  mean(Green) ~ PP 0.01 0.96 67 
CUL Green ~ PP 0.08 0.48 82 
  Green ~ sum(PP) 0.10 0.48 55 
  mean(Green) ~ sum(PP) 0.07 0.62 47 
  mean(Green) ~ PP 0.06 0.60 67 
POSTM Green ~ PP 0.05 0.68 82 
  Green ~ sum(PP) 0.05 0.70 55 
  mean(Green) ~ sum(PP) 0.08 0.60 47 
  mean(Green) ~ PP 0.06 0.65 67 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-15 – LIB: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote 
  score ~ vote cor p_value n 
RILE Lib ~ PP 0.07 0.51 97 
  Lib ~ sum(PP) 0.06 0.65 67 
  mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP) 0.14 0.41 37 
  mean(Lib) ~ PP 0.12 0.40 55 
ECO Lib ~ PP -0.02 0.83 97 
  Lib ~ sum(PP) -0.06 0.63 67 
  mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP) -0.03 0.87 37 
  mean(Lib) ~ PP -0.01 0.96 55 
CUL Lib ~ PP 0.12 0.25 97 
  Lib ~ sum(PP) 0.17 0.17 67 
  mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP) 0.18 0.28 37 
  mean(Lib) ~ PP 0.14 0.31 55 
POSTM Lib ~ PP 0.05 0.62 97 
  Lib ~ sum(PP) 0.05 0.67 67 
  mean(Lib) ~ sum(PP) 0.15 0.39 37 
  mean(Lib) ~ PP 0.11 0.44 55 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-16 – SOC: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote 
  score ~ vote cor p_value n 
RILE Soc ~ PP -0.01 0.93 59 
  Soc ~ sum(PP) 0.14 0.41 38 
  mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP) 0.14 0.42 37 
  mean(Soc) ~ PP -0.02 0.89 56 
ECO Soc ~ PP 0.00 0.97 59 
  Soc ~ sum(PP) -0.15 0.37 38 
  mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP) -0.16 0.35 37 
  mean(Soc) ~ PP -0.01 0.96 56 
CUL Soc ~ PP -0.02 0.89 59 
  Soc ~ sum(PP) 0.10 0.55 38 
  mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP) 0.07 0.67 37 
  mean(Soc) ~ PP -0.04 0.77 56 
POSTM Soc ~ PP -0.11 0.41 59 
  Soc ~ sum(PP) -0.02 0.89 38 
  mean(Soc) ~ sum(PP) -0.06 0.74 37 
  mean(Soc) ~ PP -0.13 0.33 56 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-17 – SocD: Score-Change ~ PP-Vote 
  score ~ vote cor p_value n 
RILE SocP ~ PP 0.01 0.92 100 
  SocD ~ sum(PP) 0.02 0.87 62 
  mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP) -0.02 0.89 52 
  mean(SocD) ~ PP -0.01 0.96 80 
ECO SocP ~ PP -0.15 0.14 100 
  SocD ~ sum(PP) -0.28 0.03 62 
  mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP) -0.26 0.06 52 
  mean(SocD) ~ PP -0.16 0.16 80 
CUL SocP ~ PP 0.03 0.77 100 
  SocD ~ sum(PP) 0.03 0.80 62 
  mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP) -0.08 0.59 52 
  mean(SocD) ~ PP -0.03 0.81 80 
POSTM SocP ~ PP 0.07 0.50 100 
  SocD ~ sum(PP) 0.07 0.58 62 
  mean(SocD) ~ sum(PP) -0.04 0.75 52 
  mean(SocD) ~ PP 0.00 0.98 80 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-103 – SocD ~ sum(PP) 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
6. Polarization Hypothesis [ad 8.] 
6.1 Polarization [ad 8.2.1] 
Fig. A-104 – Election-year ~ RILE-Range 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-105 – Election-year ~ CULT-Range 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-106 – Election-year ~ ECO-Range 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
6.2 Fragmentation [ad 8.2.2] 
Tab. A-18 – Correlation: Share of PP ~ ENP 
  share of PP ~ ENP 
Cor 0.26 
p-value 0.018 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-107 – Correlation: Share of PP ~ ENP 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-19 – Fragmentierung des Parteiensystems: ENP und real NP (per Country) 
country election No. PP ENP real NP Diff. ENP Diff. Real 
Sweden 09-2006 0 4.2 7     
Sweden 09-2010 1 4.7 8 0.5 1.0 
Denmark 09-1994 1 4.5 8     
Denmark 03-1998 2 4.7 10 0.2 2.0 
Netherlands 05-1998 0 4.8 9     
Netherlands 05-2002 2 6.0 10 1.1 1.0 
Netherlands 09-2012 1 5.8 11     
Netherlands 03-2017 2 8.3 13 2.5 2.0 
France 03-1993 0 3.7 4     
France 05-1997 1 4.9 6 1.2 2.0 
France 06-2007 0 2.8 5     
France 06-2012 1 4.3 10 1.5 5.0 
Italy 04-1992 2 6.0 12     
Italy 03-1994 3 6.6 11 0.6 -1.0 
Italy 04-2008 2 3.0 5     
Italy 02-2013 4 4.6 12 1.6 7.0 
Germany 09-2013 0 2.8 4     
Germany 09-2017 1 4.6 6 1.8 2.0 
Austria 11-2002 1 2.9 4     
Austria 10-2006 2 3.4 5 0.5 1.0 
United Kingdom 05-2010 0 2.9 3     
United Kingdom 05-2015 1 3.8 11 0.9 8.0 
Source: MARPOR 2020a. 
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6.3 Polarization and Fragmentation [ad 8.2.3] 
Fig. A-108 – RILE-Range ~ ENP Fig. A-109 – ECO-Range ~ ENP 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Fig. A-110 – CUL-Range ~ ENP   
 
 
Source: MARPOR 2020a; Plotted lines: Connection 
between the predicted points. 
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Tab. A-20 – Linear Regression: RILE-Range ~ ENP 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
RILE_range ~ ENP (Intercept) 20.8 8.9 2.33 0.02 
  ENP 7.7 1.9 4.09 0.00 
  r-squared 0.18    
  Adjusted r-squared 0.17    
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00    
RILE_range ~ ENP + PP (Intercept) 20.6 9.0 2.29 0.02 
  ENP 7.5 2.1 3.62 0.00 
  PP 0.8 6.4 0.12 0.90 
  r-squared 0.18    
  adjusted r-squared 0.16    
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00    
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-21 – Linear Regression: CUL-Range ~ ENP 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
CUL_range ~ ENP (Intercept) 4.1 7.3 0.56 0.58 
  ENP 10.3 1.5 6.74 0.00 
  r-squared 0.37       
  adjusted r-squared 0.36       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
CUL_range ~ ENP + PP (Intercept) 3.7 7.3 0.51 0.61 
  ENP 10.0 1.7 5.90 0.00 
  PP 2.0 5.2 0.39 0.70 
  r-squared 0.37       
  adjusted r-squared 0.36       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-22 – Linear Regression: ECO-Range ~ ENP 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
ECO_range ~ ENP (Intercept) 4.6 5.9 0.78 0.44 
  ENP 5.8 1.2 4.66 0.00 
  r-squared 0.22       
  adjusted r-squared 0.21       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
ECO_range ~ ENP + PP (Intercept) 4.8 6.0 0.80 0.43 
  ENP 5.9 1.4 4.29 0.00 
  PP -1.1 4.3 -0.25 0.81 
  r-squared 0.22       
  adjusted r-squared 0.20       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
6.4 Bipolarity [ad 8.2.4] 
Tab. A-23 – Linear Regression: mean(RILE) ~ year (+ pp) 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
mean ~ year (Intercept) 1122.23 251.92 4.45 0.00 
  year -0.56 0.13 -4.47 0.00 
  r-squared 0.21       
  adjusted r-squared 0.20       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
mean ~ year + pp (Intercept) 1193.64 255.94 4.66 0.00 
  year -0.60 0.13 -4.68 0.00 
  pp 3.70 2.71 1.36 0.18 
  r-squared 0.22       
  adjusted r-squared 0.20       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.00       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-24 – Linear Regression: max_diff(RILE) ~ year (+ pp) 
  Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
max_diff ~ year (Intercept) 539.43 244.98 2.20 0.03 
  year -0.26 0.12 -2.12 0.04 
  r-squared 0.05       
  adjusted r-squared 0.04       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.04       
max_diff ~ year + pp (Intercept) 628.93 246.87 2.55 0.01 
  year -0.30 0.12 -2.47 0.02 
  pp 4.64 2.62 1.77 0.08 
  r-squared 0.09       
  adjusted r-squared 0.07       
  p-value (F-Test) 0.04       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-25 – Linear Regression: mean(CUL) ~ year (+ pp) 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
mean ~ year (Intercept) -353,81 184,12 -1,92 0,06 
  year 0,17 0,09 1,87 0,07 
  r-squared 0,04       
  adjusted r-squared 0,03       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,07       
mean ~ year + pp (Intercept) -242,62 178,78 -1,36 0,18 
  year 0,11 0,09 1,27 0,21 
  pp 5,76 1,90 3,04 0,00 
  r-squared 0,15       
  adjusted r-squared 0,12       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,05       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-26 – Linear Regression: max_diff(CUL)/sd(CUL) ~ year (+ pp) 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
camp_diff_sd ~ year (Intercept) -1,30 4,02 -0,32 0,75 
  year 0,00 0,00 0,72 0,47 
  r-squared 0,01       
  adjusted r-squared -0,01       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,47       
camp_diff_sd ~ year + pp (Intercept) -2,07 4,11 -0,50 0,62 
  year 0,00 0,00 0,90 0,37 
  pp -0,04 0,04 -0,92 0,36 
  r-squared 0,02       
  adjusted r-squared -0,01       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,47       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-27 – Linear Regression: mean(ECO) ~ year (+ pp) 
    Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
mean ~ year (Intercept) 989,73 139,37 7,10 0,00 
  year -0,50 0,07 -7,15 0,00 
  r-squared 0,40       
  adjusted r-squared 0,39       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,00       
mean ~ year + pp (Intercept) 980,36 143,22 6,84 0,00 
  year -0,49 0,07 -6,88 0,00 
  pp -0,49 1,52 -0,32 0,75 
  r-squared 0,40       
  adjusted r-squared 0,38       
  p-value (F-Test) 0,00       
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-28 – RILE ~ Election year 
  cor p-value 
Mean value -0.45 0.00 
Mean value (Parties right of the mean) -0.41 0.00 
Mean value (Parties left of the mean) -0.32 0.00 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean -0.17 0.13 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors -0.23 0.04 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean (standardized) -0.10 0.39 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized) -0.17 0.13 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-29 – CUL ~ Election year 
  cor p-value 
Mean value 0.21 0.07 
Mean value (Parties right of the mean) 0.27 0.02 
Mean value (Parties left of the mean) 0.20 0.07 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean 0.08 0.47 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors -0.09 0.44 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean (standardized) 0.08 0.47 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized) -0.23 0.04 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-30 – ECO ~ Election year 
  cor p-value 
Mean value -0.63 0.00 
Mean value (Parties right of the mean) -0.53 0.00 
Mean value (Parties left of the mean) -0.57 0.00 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean -0.05 0.64 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors -0.16 0.16 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean (standardized) 0.08 0.50 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized) -0.20 0.07 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-31 – POSTM ~ Election year 
  cor p-value 
Mean value 0.15 0.19 
Mean value (Parties right of the mean) 0.21 0.06 
Mean value (Parties left of the mean) 0.10 0.36 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean 0.15 0.18 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors 0.06 0.60 
Difference between left and right camp’s mean (standardized) 0.06 0.57 
Maximum difference between two score neighbors (standardized) -0.08 0.49 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Fig. A-111 – RILE: Mean ~ year Fig. A-112 – CUL: Mean ~ year 
  
Source: MARPOR 2020a Source: MARPOR 2020a 




Source: MARPOR 2020a  
  
Copyright Lembcke. (2021). 
 
 121 
Tab. A-32 – RILE: Mean value ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.86 0.01 8 
Denmark -0.59 0.12 8 
Finland -0.76 0.03 8 
Netherlands 0.44 0.28 8 
France -0.56 0.25 6 
Italy -0.79 0.02 8 
Germany 0.06 0.90 8 
Austria -0.54 0.13 9 
Switzerland -0.63 0.10 8 
United Kingdom -0.58 0.13 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-33 – RILE: Mean of values right of the mean ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.95 0.00 8 
Denmark -0.35 0.40 8 
Finland -0.62 0.10 8 
Netherlands 0.43 0.29 8 
France -0.66 0.15 6 
Italy -0.68 0.07 8 
Germany 0.09 0.84 8 
Austria -0.53 0.14 9 
Switzerland -0.61 0.11 8 
United Kingdom -0.58 0.13 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-34 – RILE: Mean of values left of the mean ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.41 0.31 8 
Denmark -0.70 0.05 8 
Finland -0.60 0.11 8 
Netherlands 0.35 0.40 8 
France -0.01 0.99 6 
Italy -0.74 0.04 8 
Germany -0.02 0.96 8 
Austria -0.59 0.10 9 
Switzerland -0.64 0.09 8 
United Kingdom -0.39 0.34 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-35 – RILE: MSP ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.79 0.02 8 
Denmark 0.38 0.35 8 
Finland -0.43 0.29 8 
Netherlands 0.22 0.60 8 
France -0.88 0.02 6 
Italy -0.22 0.60 8 
Germany 0.18 0.66 8 
Austria -0.35 0.36 9 
Switzerland -0.42 0.30 8 
United Kingdom -0.01 0.97 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-36 – RILE: MD ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.64 0.09 8 
Denmark 0.10 0.82 8 
Finland -0.66 0.08 8 
Netherlands -0.15 0.72 8 
France -0.71 0.11 6 
Italy -0.12 0.78 8 
Germany 0.10 0.82 8 
Austria -0.05 0.91 9 
Switzerland -0.10 0.82 8 
United Kingdom -0.30 0.48 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
Tab. A-37 – RILE: MSP (stand.) ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.28 0.50 8 
Denmark -0.09 0.84 8 
Finland -0.30 0.47 8 
Netherlands 0.05 0.91 8 
France 0.18 0.74 6 
Italy -0.02 0.97 8 
Germany 0.30 0.47 8 
Austria -0.33 0.39 9 
Switzerland -0.60 0.12 8 
United Kingdom 0.28 0.50 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
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Tab. A-38 – RILE: MD (stand.) ~ election year 
country cor p-value n 
Sweden -0.03 0.94 8 
Denmark -0.15 0.72 8 
Finland -0.72 0.05 8 
Netherlands -0.18 0.67 8 
France -0.61 0.20 6 
Italy -0.10 0.81 8 
Germany -0.03 0.94 8 
Austria 0.36 0.34 9 
Switzerland -0.01 0.99 8 
United Kingdom -0.50 0.20 8 
Source: MARPOR 2020a 
